EU Accession and its Impact on Romania’s Political Economy - Brian Safran

             Since the collapse of the totalitarian and violent regime of Nicolae Ceausescu in 1989, Romania has miraculously transformed itself from a state of political backwardness and economic isolation into a western-style democracy and a burgeoning free-market economy. Perhaps the most influential factor initiating the drastic changes that have come to characterize modern-day Romania has been the prospect of membership in the European Union that began shortly after the Ceausescu regime was toppled and a democratic form of governance established. Along the path to membership, Romania has had to undertake a series of comprehensive structural reforms to fulfill the pre-accession requirements set forth by the European Union. Revolutionary reforms were accomplished incrementally, allowing for a progressive strengthening of Romania’s democracy, and affording it placement on a trajectory of economic growth. An analysis of Romania’s accession into the EU, and in particular, the progress it has made in reducing corruption, protecting minority rights and forging a free market economy can demonstrate how membership has consolidated its democracy and improved upon the aggregate standard of living of its peoples.

While the fall of communism initially brought economic and political instability to Romania, the objective of securing EU membership has been a driving force in reducing political corruption, social tension, and economic mismanagement in the country. (Canberra 2005:18) Although Romania became a full-fledged member of the European Union in 2007, the process of securing its accession began in 1995 when the Romanian government officially submitted its application for membership. (Lovatt 1999:1) In 2002, Romania was formally invited to join the EU upon its fulfillment of a multitude of domestic policy reforms. (Canberra 2005:18) This required that Romania agree to the European Union’s acquis communautaire, requiring its government to align its legislative framework and political and economic objectives with that of the EU. (Ram 2003:29) In exchange, membership in the EU was believed to offer Romania political stability and the means to economic prosperity.

Rampant corruption plagued Romania after the collapse of the Ceausescu regime, rendering its desire to establish a democracy a struggle. The 1991 introduction of a new constitution paved the way for democratic reform, yet true democracy was undermined by the ability of Ceausescu’s protégés and supporters to fill roles in the Romanian bureaucracy after his death. (Lovatt 1999: 1; Anyz 2005: 18) The former communists were able to gain control of the Social Democratic Party, which governed the country in the early 1990s and again in the early 2000s. (Country Watch 2007:1, 5) Under the leadership of Ion Iliescu and Adrian Nastase in the early 2000s, the SDP afforded businesses special privileges; and under their rule, flaws in the democratic institutional structure of the country were perpetuated, ranging from rampant corruption and control over the media to political interference in the workings of the judicial system. (Anyz 2005:18) Furthermore, the then existing judicial system did not promote equality before the law. Judicial proceedings were fraught with bribery and afforded the wealthy and powerful special exemptions from its authority. (BBC H 2005:1) Such occurrences perpetuated a system biased in favor of the rich; and thus impeded upon the establishment of true democracy.

Many Romanians believe that extensive corruption in their country has been the primary inhibitor to meaningful political change and improvements to its standard of living. (Sullivan 2006:2) In response to criticism by EU observers in the early 2000s, the Romanian government was advised to progress toward reducing corruption to further strengthen its democracy. (BBC H 2005:1) Popular support of EU accession in Romania dictated that the elected government adhere to its mandates; and meeting accession obligations have been a positive force for change. (Burduja 2006:64) One of the most influential individuals often credited with having placed Romania on track for accession was then Justice Minister Monica Macovei, who sought out to establish a fair and incorruptible justice system by instituting training programs for judges, establishing a computer system by which to identify and track corruption, and commencing investigations into the affairs of numerous politicians who were alleged to have engaged in corruption. (Irish Times 2006:1) The progress achieved under her direction in part afforded Romania the opportunity to join the EU in 2007.

EU influence has led to the creation of a prosperous civil-society, contributing to the establishment of a participatory atmosphere and a democratic political culture. (Phinnimore 2004: 217) In a pivotal election in 2005, election observers from non-governmental organizations found the SPD attempting to manipulate the election results in their favor; and based on their criticism, the SPD was forced to yield its power to a center-right government formed under the leadership of Traian Basescu. (Anyz 2005:19) Not only did this finding and the result that followed evidence the newfound strength of Romania’s civil-society and democracy, it also demonstrated progress in Romania’s ability to curb corruption; serving to accelerate Romania entry into the EU. Under the leadership of President Basescu that followed, Romania was able to secure an accession treaty from the European Union and pass it through the Romanian parliament, affording the country entry into the EU in 2007. (Country Watch 2007:7)

Although Romania was permitted to join the EU in 2007, it remained clear that it had yet to accomplish its obligation to establish a fully independent judiciary able to tackle prevalent, ongoing corruption. (EurActiv 2007:1) There remains throughout Romanian society a dangerous assumption that all functions performed by the political elite are done so with some degree of rule bending. (Anyz 2005: 18) In 2006, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index found Romania to rank worst in the entire twenty-seven-member European Union. (Shepherd 2007: 117) However, as noted by former Justice Minister Macovei, a widespread and fundamental transformation of the judiciary cannot be achieved overnight. (BBC H 2005:1) Nevertheless, signs of improvement of are visible. The recent establishment of a National Anti-Corruption Department demonstrates the extent of Romania’s ongoing commitment. (Sullivan 2006:2) Over the past year, numerous investigations and arrests of high-ranking public officials have occurred, evidencing continued progress. (EurActiv 2007:1) One such investigation was undertaken into the affairs of former Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, which many observers believed to evidence the newfound ability of the justice system to subject even the most powerful of politicians to its authority (Sullivan 2006:3-4) Thus, Romania has continued its effort to reduce corruption and promote democracy even after securing its membership in the EU.

Another contentious issue for Romania has been the historical subordination of minority groups such as ethnic Hungarians and the Roma to the dominant Romanians.

The continuation of this relationship between the groups stood in direct confrontation to fundamental EU principles; which require the rights of minorities be protected under the law. (Europa 2007:1) The protection of such rights is perceived to evidence the existence of a functioning democracy and is a method by which to ensure the maintenance of social stability. (Lovatt 1999:1) Ethnic Hungarians and the Roma combined compose about ten percent of the Romanian population. (Economist B 2007:1; Dianu 1997) These groups have a long history of being refused civil rights by the Romanian majority on the grounds that they pose a threat to the unity of the country. (BBC A 2007:1) Yet in order to attain membership in the Council of Europe, and subsequently the EU, Romania was compelled in the mid-1990s to agree to the supranational protection of minority rights through the European Court of Human Rights. (Ram 2003: 36) One of the most contentious issues has been the protection of Hungarian language rights under the law. In an effort to quell criticism at home and abroad just prior to the EU rendering its decision on whether to commence accession negotiations in 1997, the Education Law was revised to allow minority students to be taught in their national language. (Dianu 1999:2) In addition, evidence suggests that the decision to include the UDMR, a political party composed of ethnic Hungarians, in 1996 and again in 2000 in governing coalitions was in part based on an effort to prove its inclusion of the group to the EU and international observers. (Ram 2003:38, 45) The recent establishment of a National Council for Combating Discrimination and the passage of strict hate crime statutes to protect minorities further evidence the transformative effect of EU regulations. (Sullivan 2006:4)

Although rights of ethnic Hungarians have improved substantially, some allege that those of the Roma minority have not. (Sullivan 2006:3) However, progress has been shown. In response to a recent murder committed by a Roma migrant from Romania in Italy, Romania’s primer has created an advisory panel of experts to develop policies that aim to better integrate the Roma minority; and has called on the European Commission to do the same. (BBC D 2007:1) The need to maintain a reputable image in the larger context of EU relations has required the Romanian government to abandon its former ethnocentric stance and introduce policies that integrate all of its peoples into Romanian society. Thus, the evolution of minority rights in Romania and their incorporation into the framework of Romanian politics and society demonstrates the extent to which EU accession has furthered the democratization efforts of Romania.

In addition to strengthening democracy and reducing social tension, the requirements of EU accession have served to strengthen and consolidate Romania’s free-market economy. Prior to commencing the accession process, Romania’s economy was characterized by the existence of inefficient and unproductive enterprises, nationalized utilities, and an archaic financial system. (Phinnemore 2006:30) To adhere to the requirements of EU accession, Romania was obliged in the early 2000s to undergo an extensive privatization campaign, introduce free market reform, and achieve the capacity to compete on the European market. (BBC B 2005:1) A major step towards achieving that end was undertaken in January 2001, after property seized under communist rule was to be legally returned to its former owners. (Country Watch 2007:5)  As per EU regulations, Romania has had to establish a fully competitive business environment in which all companies are given equal treatment by the government. (Sava 2006:1) The 2005 introduction of a flat tax also served to encourage foreign and domestic investment, helping the country to achieve a staggering growth rate of almost seven percent of its GDP in 2006. (BBC G 2007:1) Romania has simultaneously been able to achieve a budget deficit rate of 2.8 percent of its GDP, below the EU-set threshold of three percent, one of the prerequisites for EU countries to join the Euro zone (Shepherd 2007:118).

In addition to improving its macroeconomic indicators, the progressive change stemming from reforms required by the EU has impacted the average Romanian citizen, who has seen substantial improvement in their quality of life and standard of living. Restaurants and shopping centers have sprung up in previously impoverished neighborhoods and a series of massive construction projects have commenced in numerous localities. (Carey 2004:553-54) Such development has allowed Romania to utilize its substantial labor pool to its fullest, affording the country one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe. (Sava 2007:1) In addition, the expected inflow of common agricultural policy monies is expected to increase the productivity of Romanian agriculture and farming, an important source of income in the Romanian economy. (Condon 2007:29) Thus, Romania’s securing of membership into the European Union has brought about economic change for its betterment.

The extent of Romania’s effort to improve upon its political economy while meeting the requirements of EU membership has, and will likely continue to be maintained in the post-accession era. The ongoing impact of the EU is evidenced by continued democratic and free-market reform since its accession in January 2007.  In the spring of 2007, the strength of Romania’s democracy was put to the test after President Basescu was suspended from office in the on the grounds that he had failed to uphold the constitution. (Connolly 2007: 26) The fact that Romanian voters refused to impeach him in the referendum that ensued was attestation to the potency of the democratic process as it evidenced electoral legitimacy. (Country Watch 2007:9; BBC F 2007:2) On the economic front, Prime Minister Calin Popscu Tariceanu recently commenced a large-scale effort to improve upon Romania’s infrastructure and relative competitiveness vis-à-vis other European countries, propagating increasing average wage rates, rising aggregate personal consumption and declining inflation. (Economist A 2007:1-2) EU membership has reduced the perception of political and economic risk among investors, and many believe that Romania’s newfound ability to market its highly skilled yet comparatively cheap labor force will put it at a marked advantage in the years to come. (Shepard 2007: 119) Romania has not faltered in its adherence to its European Union commitment, and despite its need to undergo further reforms, it has demonstrated an unwavering desire to attain a prominent position on the map of Europe.

Some analysts fear that the drive toward reform will fade as the incentives for continued efforts to democratize and privatize fall by the wayside. (Shepard 2007: 118) However, many others note that incentives for conformity with EU demands still remain. As per Romania’s Accession Treaty, the commission retains the ability to reduce EU funding and to refuse to recognize the decisions of the Romanian court system at the EU level. (EurActiv 2007:1; Parker 2006:1) If Romania desires to use the benefits of its membership to their fullest by becoming an active and respectable participant in EU affairs, it will need to continue its effort to root out corruption and comply with the economic policies embedded in EU law after its accession. (BBC C 2006:1) Furthermore, Romania’s desire to further the cause of integration by joining the Schengen area, which harmonizes policies related to immigration and law enforcement between its members, will require the country to meet further European demands. (BBC E 2007:1) Thus, the EU will likely continue to improve upon Romania’s domestic trajectory for the years to come.

Romania has undergone a series of reforms since the Romanian Revolution of 1989 that marked the end of the Ceausescu era. Initially plagued by the remnants of an archaic, corrupt and discriminatory communist regime, the country in the post-communist period seemed unable to create and sustain a fully functioning democracy. Romania’s eventual desire for entry into the European Union was based on the belief that membership would improve Romania’s socio-economic standing, and afford it a degree of competitiveness comparable to that of other European countries. However, inclusion into the ‘club of democracies’ did not come without a price. Romania was required to make numerous concessions, compelling the country to undergo substantial political and economic reform. Among these changes were the requirements that Romania reduce the instance of corruption, protect the rights of its minorities, and align its economic policies with that of the EU. In effect, these undertakings have served to strengthen Romania’s democracy while simultaneously promoting free market reform; instilling a perception of political stability and encouraging foreign investment. An analysis of the transformations undertaken by Romania in preparation for and subsequent to EU membership demonstrates how supranational integration in Europe can contribute to the political stability of its members and the economic improvement of their citizenry.

Works Cited

Anyz, Daniel. "Romania's Journey." The New Presence (2005): 17-19. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Hofstra University, Hempstead. 11 Nov. 2007. Keyword: Romania and European Union.

"Bulgaria and Romania Rebuffed Over Corruption and Justice Reform." EurActiv. 6 July 2007. 13 Nov. 2007 <http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/bulgaria-romania-rebuffed-corruption-justice-reform/article-1 (cited in text as EurActiv)

Burduja, Sebastian. "Assessing Corruption in Romania: an Integrationist Story." Stanford's Student Journal of Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies (2006): 51-69. 13 Nov. 2007 <http://zhe.stanford.edu/spring06/corruption.pdf>.

Carey, Henry F. Romania Since 1989: Politics, Economics, and Society. 1st ed. Vol. 1. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004. 1-640.

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Phinnemore, David A., ed. The Eu and Romania: Accession and Beyond. 1st ed. Vol. 1. London: The Federal Trust, 2006. 1-230.

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Marxist Alienation in a Post-Modern World - Brian Safran

Karl Marx’s theory of alienation, although intended to reflect the inequities of nineteenth century Europe, is analogous to the plight of the worker in a contemporary capitalistic society. When Marx wrote his influential sociological theory, he believed himself to have been addressing an extremely specific audience. His writings were focused towards the upper class white elites of nineteenth-century Europe, in an attempt influence those in positions of power, and thus, impact the course of history. (20 Hughes) Marx directed his analysis at the challenges that workers faced during the Industrial Revolution, and his purpose was to educate and enlighten the society around him to the realities of the exploitation of the worker. (2 Levy) Although Marx’s writings were directed at a specific group of people living within a particular time period, he would not be surprised to find that despite major changes in the workforce, the social hierarchy of the modern capitalistic workplace continues to alienate its workers, demean their autonomy, and reduce them to mere machinery, much the same as it did in the mid-nineteenth century.

            Marx analyzed his theory of alienation from the materialist perspective, and focused on free wage labor to accentuate his argument. He referred to an important shift in ideology when he said that “labour produces not only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a commodity” (35 Marx). With the onset of free wage labor, the worker as well as the products he created became exchangeable on the market. As a product, the worker himself became a machine that afforded monetary value to an employer. Thus, the employer saw the employee as something in need of control in order to increase his production revenue. As more control was exerted over the employee, he was robbed of his autonomy, and was subject to increasing degrees of alienation from himself, his product, the production process, as well as his managers and peers.

            As seen by Marx, the worker under capitalism felt alienated from the product because he was no longer producing it for its intrinsic value, but for the capital it generated. In essence, the ultimate goal of the producing the product became not the product itself, but instead, the money associated with its sale. The pride that one would take in craftsmanship or in the performance of “a job well done” was measured not by the actual accomplishment, but in the value of the monetary reward that it was capable of deriving. In addition, the object itself became an “external existence,” as no matter how great his need for the item, at the end of the day the worker must give away that which he had produced (35 Marx). Marx saw the worker as dominated by the product. (7 Cox) He wrote that “the worker puts his life into the object, but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object” (35 Marx). The worker sold his creativity, and in exchange received money, with which he could buy products. But what he could not repurchase was his creativity; that was lost forever. (7 Cox) He had been both exploited and alienated- from his product and from himself.

            Marx furthered his analysis by citing an estrangement between the worker and the production process. The worker created products using machinery and materials that were not owned by him, and under rules and regulations of which he had no say in. (5 Bramann) He had no control of the process, and no ownership of its rewards. Furthermore the worker was forced to produce to the limits of his “physical and mental energy” (37 Marx). The “fragmentation,” or specialization of the labor process had allowed employers to gain increasing control over the workers, as workers were expected to perform highly specific jobs in exactly the same way, repetitively (8 Cox). This served to stunt intellectual and creative growth in the workplace and alienate workers from their mundane day-to-day activities.

            Marx felt that man has a natural need to be productive and creative. Depriving himself of his basic needs caused his labor to become external to him and resulted in an absence of his sense of self-identity through his work. He viewed himself as “at home when he [was] not working, and when he [was] working he [did] not feel at home” (37 Marx). Work was no longer a gratifying force in his life, thus requiring him to look elsewhere for self-gratification. He had been alienated from his human self, and “in his human functions [the worker] no longer [felt] himself to be anything but an animal” (37 Marx). Freedom could only have been achieved through the exercising of man’s most animalistic functions, such as “eating, drinking and procreating” (37 Marx).

            Alienation from one’s peers, co-workers, and superiors soon followed. Marx felt that the demand for ever-increasing productivity created a competitive environment in the workplace and beyond. All relationships became valued by how much they would contribute or take away from productivity. He felt that this “[served] to replace communal values with competitive individualistic ones” (36 Hughes). A “fundamental social antagonism” developed, and continuously perpetuated itself (41 Hughes). Under these conditions, workers lost their desire to produce and work became “not voluntary, but coerced; it [was] forced labour” (37 Marx). Work no longer brought happiness as it was perceived as an enslaving force, and was “shunned like the plague” (37 Marx).

The changing times have brought about a shift from an industrial-centered economy into a service-oriented job market. The middle class population is a product of that change. The standard of living of today’s capitalists is not as distinguishably different from that of the present day working class, and the boundaries between them are not as sharp. (2 Bramann) But is today’s middle class really so different from the proletariat class of Marx’s time?  Marx believed that social classes were grouped according to common relations to the production process, rather than economic worth. (1 Gingrich) This would thereby equate the middle class to the proletariat, as they both represent the working class of their respective times. Marx also felt that this working class was persecuted by the capitalistic system under which it existed. Modern middle class thinking portrays this group as having achieved a degree of economic and social independence not previously attainable. But does today’s middle class really enjoy an economic freedom that works to foster the individual’s sense of self worth and autonomy, or is it too victimized by a system that only rewards the elite? By analyzing the practices of capitalist institutions, one can gain insight into the application of Marx’s alienation in today’s society.

Modern capitalist governments pride themselves on their ability to maintain internal harmony while competing in a global economy. They place value on such things as low unemployment rates, rising corporate growth and low rates of inflation, and use them as measures of their prosperity as a nation. Marxist theory, if applied to this model, would likely argue that the while the fundamental concept of the need of governments to maintain domestic tranquility is correct; the mechanisms employed by capitalistic governments to achieve this goal are flawed. He would also probably argue that the measures of success utilized by these capitalists are incorrect and that success is only attainable when the individuals of a society are free of oppression. Marx would likely see the strategies that are used by these societies to advance themselves, as alienating the very individuals that they were designed to benefit.

In addition to the government as a capitalistic institution, capitalistic societies pride themselves on the strength of big business. The McDonald’s corporation has grown into a multi-billion dollar business, and exemplifies many of the characteristics of alienation previously shunned by Marx. Contemporary sociological theory has coined the practices of McDonald’s as “McDonaldization.” Under “McDonaldization,” advancements in technology are used to “deskill and control workers,” and follow the McDonald’s corporate model (53 Aronowitz). McDonald’s incorporates similar mechanisms of command at each of their 11,800 locations to increase productivity and ensure product standardization. (40 Leidner) Employees are given minimal to no individuality in their work. The various jobs at McDonald’s restaurants are specialized and repetitive to foster speed and efficiency, and employees are expected to conform to a predetermined set of rules and regulations.  To ensure their compliance, technological advances such as computers and cameras are utilized as monitoring devices. In addition, work schedules are adjusted to clientele volume in order to allow for the maximum amount of corporate productivity.  This economic model has been employed by various companies throughout the capitalistic world, in attempt to remove any individuality, creativity, and freedom in the workplace, thus placing the worker in an easily expendable and replaceable position. Marx would consider McDonald’s employees to be an “appendage of the machine” (81 Marx). As such, the worker fails to develop an allegiance to his job and the product that is being produced, serving to perpetuate the alienation. The result of this is a strong, rich and powerful corporation, and a poor, estranged employee. 

Scientific and technological advances have made communication and information easily accessible. Such innovations have “freed” workers from their previous constraints, but in doing so have made the workers more dispensable. Workers are no longer needed to work jobs that could now be done more efficiently by machines. Examples of this include the mass production technique known as “Fordism,” where large numbers of cars are produced by the aid of machines along an assembly line (53 Aronowitz). With job security on the line, workers have had to maintain their own competitive edge. This has often required expansion of work hours that previously were dedicated to pleasure. Employees have been forced to “transform every place into a work place,” and often work nights and weekends to remain competitive (54 Aronowitz). Women have entered the work force in amazing numbers and the anonymous nature of the computer generation has caused “differences of age and sex [to] have no longer any distinctive social validity for the working class” (81 Marx). While this has furthered the cause for women’s rights, with all family members working to their maximum potential, the family unit as a whole has undoubtedly been negatively impacted. Marx would potentially view this as the ultimate exploitation of the worker, removing from him the last freedom he has left, the freedom to manage his own spare time. (54 Aronowitz)

Analysis of the social structure in capitalist countries has shown the emergence of an “upper” middle class. This partly consists of the trained professionals that are commonly perceived to have risen in ranks from that of the salaried worker. However, Marx would not support this concept, but instead would argue that the opposite has occurred. Such professionals have actually taken a downward spiral back to that of a salaried worker. (59 Aronowitz) Physicians and attorneys are amongst those trained professionals that have traditionally been associated with independent entrepreneurship. An influx of bureaucracy has lowered their decision-making ability and technological change has depersonalized their work. (59 Aronowitz) They have had to face a change in practice that has constrained their autonomy. Job satisfaction has deteriorated as exemplified by “significant declines in medical school enrollments” (60 Aronowitz). Not even the upper-middle class is exempt from the dilemma of alienation facing the salaried worker.

Marx’s theory of alienation in a capitalist society is as relevant today as it was when he wrote it one hundred and sixty two years ago. Changes in social structure, technological innovation, and in the job market have effectively hidden it beneath the surface when compared concurrently with that of the nineteenth century. Perhaps today’s workers experience estrangement from their product, the production process, themselves, their employers, and their co-workers on an even greater scale than those of Marx’s time. Living under the shroud of a prosperous and protected society, hopes and expectations for success have been escalated. People are blinded to the subservient nature of their existence and appear unaware that their actions, or lack there of, only serve to perpetuate their entrapment. For the most part, they seem blinded to the reality that no matter how hard they try, they will never get ahead in the current system, as forces that they cannot control continue to dominate them. It will take a major structural re-design to successfully afford a sense of control and a reversal of alienation. Marx feels that as the proletariat class awareness continues to grow, it will eventually rise up “stronger, firmer, [and] mightier” than before (82 Marx). When reality sets in, despair and desperation will reign and revolution will result. This chapter in history has yet to be written, but if history continues to follow Marx’s theory, capitalism as we know it will face an inevitable challenge.

Works Cited:

Bramann, Jorn. "Marx on Alienation." Philosophical Forum. 2004. Frostburg State University. 13 Mar. 2006 <http://faculty.frostburg.edu/phil/forum/Marx.htm>.

Cox, Judy. "An Introduction to Marx's Theory of Alienation." International Socialism 79 (1998): 1-22.

Gingrich, Paul. "Marx on Social Class." Marx's Theory of Social Class and Class Structure. 28 Sep. 1999. University of Regina. 13 Mar. 2006 <http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/s28f99.htm>.

Hughes, John A. Understanding Classical Sociology. 2nd ed. London: Sage Publications, 1995.

Leidner, Robin. "Over the Counter: McDonald's." Mapping the Social Landscape: Readings in Sociology. Ed. Susan J. Ferguson. Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002. 40.

Levy, Jerry. Marx's Goals and Ours. 10 Sep. 1995. Wake Forest University. 11 Mar. 2006 <http://ricardo.ecn.wfu.edu/~cottrell/OPE/archive/9509/0067.html>.

Marx, Karl. "Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844." Classical Sociological Theory. Ed. Craig Calhoun. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2002. 34-43.

Marx, Karl. "Manifesto of the Communist Party." Classical Sociological Theory. Ed. Craig Calhoun. Malden: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2002. 76-84.

Social Solidarity and Its Impact on the Legal System - Brian Safran

           The interactions among individuals in primitive societies can be contrasted with the way in which people relate to each other in modern contemporary societies. This alteration in social unity, or solidarity was seen by Emile Durkheim, a late nineteenth century sociologist to have been the result of changes in “social facts,” which he referred to as the “beliefs, tendencies and practices of [a] group taken collectively” (114 Calhoun). Spurred by his observations of the evolution of societies from the period of economic traditionalism to the period of economic rationalism, Durkheim analyzed how they adapted to change. When he wrote his influential sociological theory, he believed society to have already undergone this transformation.

In The Division of Labor in Society, Durkheim sought out to criticize the historicist arguments of his predecessors, and describe a shift in the “collective consciousness” to an “individual consciousness,” which resulted from the division of labor (39 Durkheim; 167 Hughes). In traditional societies, Durkheim saw the social order as focused on “mechanical solidarity,” in which individuals were held together by their similarities, and their subsequent need for social conformity (85 Durkheim). When societies became more and more complex, people were held together by their perceived differences, typifying “organic solidarity” (85 Durkheim).  The specialization of roles and skills were seen to actually foster interdependence among people, as individuals could no longer fulfill all of their needs alone. (132 Durkheim)  Durkheim saw mechanical and organic solidarity to be the extremes of a continuum, and used legal code as a measurement of solidarity among different societies. He believed that a direct correlation existed between the characteristics of interpersonal connections and the quantity and type of laws that were enacted within a particular society. In traditional societies, there was a preponderance of repressive law, in which offenders were punished for deviating from social norms. In complex, modern societies, restitutive laws and their associated sanctions prevail, whereby the offender is not punished, but rather, forced to make amends and restore society to the “status quo” (68 Durkheim).

            In the most traditional of societies, people were held together purely by mechanical solidarity. People perceived themselves to be similar units of a collective whole. Durkheim referred to such groups as “horde[s],” in which regardless of age and sex, people were “linked to one another with the same degree of kinship” (127 Durkheim). Slightly more progressive were “segmentary societies,” whereby individuals were held together by their similarities within a particular family or “clan” (127 Durkheim). These two typologies encompassed forms of mechanical solidarity, as their social structures were “comprise[d] of homogeneous segments similar to one another” (131 Durkheim). Furthermore, “their solidarity [was] the weaker the more heterogeneous they [were], and vice versa,” demonstrating the importance of similarities in the context of their social relationships (128 Durkheim).

            In the process of forming his positivist argument, Durkheim made generalizations based on examples of societies and laws that demonstrated his points. What he found was that a preponderance of penal or repressive law manifested itself within these traditional societies. These laws are characterized by the sanctions imposed upon their violators, which intend to “do harm to him through his fortune, his honour, his life, his liberty, or to deprive him of some object whose possession he enjoys” (29 Durkheim). Penal law promotes “sameness” within a society, as its enactment functions to confine social interactions according to set standards. It “ensure[s] respect for all beliefs, traditions, and collective practices… and defend[s] the common consciousness from all its enemies” (42 Durkheim). Punishment “avenges… the outrage to morality,” and is itself an “emotional reaction,” doled out by society or those individuals that symbolically represent the society (44,46 Durkheim). The reaction associated with a particular crime “does not occur in each individual in isolation but all together and in unison,” thus demonstrating that the collective consciousness of the society is what is harmed by the actions of a criminal (57 Durkheim). Not only did a preponderance of repressive law occur in societies in which people related to one another by mechanical solidarity, but also, such similarities actually served to foster the creation of repressive law.

            The mechanical solidarity that existed in traditional societies can be contrasted to organic solidarity, which subsists in modern contemporary societies. Durkheim described organic solidarity as the social relationships in which people perceive themselves to be “different from one another,” and furthermore, stated that organic solidarity “is only possible if each one of us has a sphere of action that is peculiarly our own, and consequently a personality” (85 Durkheim). Durkheim compared the organs that compose the human body to the characteristics of organic solidarity when he stated that “each [organ] has a special role and which themselves are formed from differentiated parts,” and they are “co-ordinated and subordinated to one another around the same central organ, which exerts over the rest of the organism a moderating effect” (132 Durkheim). Similar to the components of the human body, each person plays a specialized role in modern society.

Durkheim further developed his argument when he stated that, “each organ has its own special characteristics and autonomy, yet the greater the unity of the organism, the more marked the individualisation of the parts” (85 Durkheim). Therefore, although organic solidarity is based on differences between people, it nonetheless serves to bring them together. Durkheim went on to describe this symbiotic relationship when he stated that organic solidarity is the type that “brings about a division of labor” (85 Durkheim). As societies increase in complexity, “individuals are distributed within its groups that are no longer formed in terms of any ancestral relationship, but according to the special nature of the social activity to which they devote themselves” (132 Durkheim). One’s role becomes a “single task which is their individual contribution to the working of society as a whole” (165 Hughes). In essence, increasing individualism leads to specialization in the workforce. The more specialized the workforce, the stronger it becomes. Durkheim advanced this theory even further when he conceptualized a phenomenon known as “sui generis,” which stated that a society assumes a character over and above that of its individual members, and has the capacity to exist independent of them (114 Calhoun).

The concept of organic solidarity and its associated division of labor has served to bring about a preponderance of civil or restitutive law, which is designed to mediate between increasingly dissimilar interpersonal relationships. Civil law code generally refers to the overarching body that subdivides into contract, commercial, procedural, administrative, and constitutional law. (81 Durkheim) These types of law are characterized by their attempt to restore society to the “status quo,” whereby the offender is not punished per se, but is instead “merely condemned to submit to it” (68 Durkheim). Therefore, violations of civil law codes can not be sanctioned by terms of imprisonment or fines for the direct purpose of punishment, as they are “simply a means of putting back the clock so as to restore the past, so far as possible, to its normal state” (68 Durkheim).

Restitutive-type laws tend to “either constitute no part at all of the collective consciousness, or subsist in it in only a weak state,” as they generally “have no deep roots in most of us” (69 Durkheim). As opposed to violations of the penal code, self-interested individuals are the ones who generally bring about civil lawsuits. Nonetheless, restitutive laws “do not merely concern private individuals” (70 Durkheim). This is demonstrated in that “it is society that declares what the law is, through its body of representatives” (70 Durkheim). Furthermore, “the law is pre-eminently a social matter, whose object is absolutely different from the interests of the litigants” (70 Durkheim). The purpose of the legal system is to protect itself, and ensure that whatever the outcome of a particular civil case, it ends in correlation with the established code of law, thus protecting the interests of the greater society. (70 Durkheim) The majority of legal code in modern societies is comprised of civil law. This type of law regulates the cohesiveness of interpersonal relationships. Under organic solidarity, individuals become increasingly different from one another, and are therefore more in need of mediation. As similar to penal law, restitutive law functions in a cyclical pattern with organic solidarity, as the more unique individuals become, the more restitutive laws are needed to maintain the status quo.

By using differences in legal code as empirical evidence, Durkheim’s work in The Division of Labor in Society exemplifies how he was able to elevate the study of sociology and transform it into a scientific discipline. He focused on objective evidence to advance sociological principles, and opined that the “preconceptions of the author before he began his research” should be eliminated so as to allow him to study society “from the outside” (160 Hughes; 111 Calhoun). Durkheim believed that sociological data could not be complied “through mere observation, since it is not wholly and entirely within any one of us” (111 Calhoun). He fortified his position by arguing that the “determining cause of a social fact must be sought among antecedent social facts and not among the states of the individual consciousness” (125 Calhoun). In other words, Durkheim believed that social facts exist to explain social life in modern societies that are independent of the actions of its individual members. The principles introduced by Durkheim and his efforts to study society objectively clearly allowed sociology to achieve recognition within the academic community and thus contribute to the rise of modern sociology.

Emile Durkheim described a shift in social interactions among individuals in their given societies in terms of the differences between mechanical and organic solidarity. He perceived the root of this transition to be the onset of the division of labor in the workforce, and the subsequent individuality that it fostered. Thus, a modification occurred in which a society that had been dominated by its strong sense of “collective consciousness” was replaced with an “individual consciousness,” whereby people began to think of themselves as unique. The structuring of legal code in a given society reflects the social order maintained within that society. Both forms of solidarity are manifested within legal code, and it demonstrates how the ways in which people connect to one another change over time. The preponderance of either repressive or restitutive law, respectively, is used to indicate where a particular society falls upon a gradual, yet compulsory path towards economic rationalism. Traditional societies, which are characterized by mechanical solidarity, tend to legislate a majority of their laws within the repressive realm, whereas modern societies, which are characterized by organic solidarity, tend to legislate a majority of their laws within the restitutive realm. Emile Durkheim is credited with advancing the study of sociology to the level of a science, independent of other related disciplines. His theories give social phenomena an independent, perpetual existence external from that of any individual within the society. Furthermore, these phenomena have the ability to exert power over an individual, which can manifest itself in law designed to maintain the social order. Emile Durkheim’s study of social solidarity surely demonstrates why many deem him to be one of the most influential thinkers behind the development of modern sociology.

Works Cited:

Durkheim, Emile. The Division of Labor in Society. 1st ed. Vol. 1. New York, NY: The Free Press, 1984. 1-341. [cited in text as Durkheim]

Durkheim, Emile. "The Rules of Sociological Method." Classical Sociological Theory. Ed. Craig Calhoun. Malden, MA: Blackwell Ltd, 2002. 109-127. [cited in text as Calhoun].

Hughes, John A., Wes W. Sharrock, and Peter J. Martin. "Emile Durkheim." Understanding Sociological Theory. London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2003. 145-201.

How is justice possible? Marx versus Rawls. - Brian Safran

         Karl Marx and John Rawls are two of the most influential thinkers in modern philosophy. In his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx asserts that moral principles can be equated with ideologies; created to further the interests of the dominant social class. He argues that under capitalism, the oppression of the proletariat, or working class will lead to their eventual rebellion; sparking the destruction of the existing socio-economic polity and rendering moral concepts meaningless. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls assesses the proper role of justice and morality in society. He does so by analyzing the underpinnings associated with social agreements, seeing social justice as being attained by adhering to universally applicable principles that ignore the particular happenstance of their authors. In analyzing the works of both philosophers, one can see that the Rawslian principles of justice seek to justify capitalism by placing it under a shroud of altruism. Instead, the communist revolution as characterized by Marx is the only way for capitalist societies to truly attain complete social justice and moral equality.

            I will begin by first examining the theoretical framework from which Marx forms moral concepts. As a “historical materialist,” Marx views concrete historical conditions as responsible for forming one’s conception of moral ideas (Denise 193). He characterizes this view when he states that “the production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life” (Denise 196). Marx considers the economic mode of production to be paramount in shaping one’s viewpoint on philosophy; thus justifying his subsequent critique of capitalism. This view is demonstrated when Marx states that “what [men] are… coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce” (Denise 196) By extension, Marx perceives particular philosophical ways of thinking to be mere “forms of ideology;” bound to the socio-economic context in which they exist (Denise 193). He states that “the individuals composing the ruling class possess among other things consciousness, and therefore think;” arguing that the members of the dominant social class collectively determine which moral principles will guide society in accord with their own self-interest (Denise 197). Also, Marx criticizes social contract theorists for characterizing the essence of humanity by the biological strictures of human nature. Instead, Marx believes in the doctrine of generic essence, according to which the human experience can be fully examined only by considering man in the context of his relations with others, and not in terms of his physical nature. This point of view is evidenced when Marx states that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In reality it is the ensemble of [his] social relations” (Marx A 2). Marx’s conceptions of historical materialism, morality as ideology, and the generic essence form the theoretical underpinnings of his social and moral philosophy. 

            Now that we have established the framework of Marx’s theory, let us now examine Marx’s critique of modern society; namely, of the division of labor that arises under capitalism. Marx believes that in such an economy, two social classes arise with inherently opposed and irreconcilable interests; the capitalists, who own the means of production, and the proletariat who have no other means to sustain their lives but to sell their labor power to the capitalists. Being the only group that “possess[es] consciousness,” Marx contends that the members of the capitalist class are those who forge the prevailing ideals in capitalist societies (Denise 197). Thus, although the economic mode of production determines the dominant ideology of a given society, this ideology manifests itself in other segments of society; including politics, philosophy and science.

Marx then characterizes the members of the proletariat class as embodying a peculiar form of “alienation;” the doctrine according to which humans are hostile or alien in their relations with others (Denise 194). He states that the capitalists exploit the labor of the proletariat, forcing them effectively against their will to engage in monotonous work in order to sustain their very existence. The proletariat are enslaved to the capitalists, and the work that they do is unfulfilling, automated, externalized and routinized. Not only do the proletariat produce commodities that they do not own, but they themselves become an exchangeable commodity. This view is evidenced when Marx states that “labor not only produces commodities; it produces itself and the laborer as a commodity and that to the extent to which it produces commodities in general” (Denise 198). In addition to becoming estranged from the fruits of their labor, the proletariat become alienated from every other worker, with whom they share no common interests; thus serving to reduce each worker to a mere “appendage of a machine” (Denise 205). Labor becomes “compulsory;” and eventually, each worker “feels himself an animal in his human functions” (Denise 199). Labor serves “only to sustain life by stunting it,” and work becomes avoided “like the plague” (Denise 200; 199). Finally, each member of the proletariat class becomes alienated from himself; finding his life absent of freedom, independence, enjoyment, and fulfillment. Each worker thus becomes entirely subjugated to and dominated by the capitalists.

In addition, the greater the degree to which the labor of the proletariat is exploited, the better off the capitalist becomes. This relationship is codified by Marx’s conception of “surplus value,” the theory according to which surplus, or profits derived from production is seen as a measure of the degree to which the capitalists exploit the proletariat (Denise 195). Although surplus value is produced by the proletariat, it is nevertheless appropriated by the capitalists. Marx states that “as capital accumulates, the lot of the laborer, be his payment high or low, must grow worse” (Denise 205). The interests of the two classes are opposed, in that the capitalists will accumulate the greatest wealth by affording the proletariat the minimum wage necessary to keep them alive and able to continue working. A contradiction ensues in that a decreasing number of people appropriate wealth as it is produced by an increasing number of workers. In seeking to maximize profit, the capitalists will strive to keep wages as low as possible, and workers as efficient as possible.

Eventually, the proletariat will come to the understanding that the economic system in which they are subjected to is unfair, unjust and detrimental to their mental and physical development; at which point they will realize their need to “abolish the very condition of their existence hitherto, namely, labor” (Denise 202). This comprehension will undoubtedly and inevitably lead them to unite with one another in an effort to overthrow the existing social system; promulgating an end to the division of labor in the name of equality. Finally, being that moral conceptions develop as a tool for the dominant class to use to their advantage, they serve no purpose in the newfound classless society. Only after this “communist revolution” will true democracy be established; in which social production will aim to fulfill human needs rather than seeking to maximize profit, the generic essence will be reestablished, and individuality will be allowed to flourish (Marx B 23).

Let us now examine John Rawls’ theory of social justice. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to discern how to best arrange for a just society and what principles would render a society just. As a supporter of Kantian deontology, Rawls believes that knowledge is “a priori,” or independent of experience; and as such, can be deemed to be “universally applicable to experience” (Denise 146). Accordingly, Rawls concerns himself with devising principles of justice that subsist whether or not they are actually put into practice. By utilizing two principles of justice which will later be elaborated upon, Rawls believes himself to conceptualize justice as a universal and absolute doctrine “not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests” (Denise 321). In addition, although Rawls disagrees with the strictures of social contract theory, he nevertheless admits that their understanding of society provides him a useful framework from which to form universalized principles. This view is demonstrated when Rawls states that “however mistaken the notion of the social contract may be as a history… it does express, suitably interpreted, an essential part of the concept of justice” (Denise 330). Thus, in accord with social contract theory, Rawls presupposes that all individuals are “mutually self-interested,” “rational,” “egoistic,” “free” and “equal in power” (Denise 324-25).

Rawls continues his argument by setting up additional “formal conditions that it seems reasonable to impose on the conceptions of justice” (Rawls 112). He first asserts that guiding social principles must be based upon “reciprocity,” or the doctrine according to which the “mutual acknowledgement of principles by free and equal persons” allows them to become universally binding (Denise 327). Once these principles are established, every individual must adhere to their precepts; and only then can fairness and justice ensue. Secondly, those that deliberate about justice and attempt to craft universally applicable principles must do so behind a hypothetical “veil of ignorance,” wherein one must make sure that the decisions that they make are impartial, unimpaired and objective (Denise 326). In order to do so, the deliberators must theoretically devoid themselves of the subjective conditions that impair judgment and derive at principles without their having knowledge of the position that they will assume henceforth. In this way, the deliberators will be unable to mold a society that accommodates their particular happenstance. Lastly, the deliberators must seek to derive at an “overlapping consensus,” or minimum common ground consisting of “all of the reasonable opposing religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines likely to persist over generations and to gain a sizeable body of interests” (Vagallis 2). This common ground is to provide the basis for the principles of justice. Only when these various preconditions are met can one derive at objective and universal theories of justice.

Now that I have examined the basic conditions that must be satisfied before a universalized theory of justice can be established, let us now look at the actual principles of justice that Rawls derives at. Rawls’ first principle of justice, or the “equal liberty principle” states that “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all” (Denise 320). In other words, Rawls is stating that for a society to be just, each citizen within it must be granted as broad a freedom as possible and be made to be as equal as possible. He provides an example of the utilization of this principle; arguing that justice is derived by adhering to the strictures of a particular legal code when the individuals subject to it are given extensive freedom, and granted analogous rights and privileges. For example, Rawls would likely have perceived modern China as an unjust society; as by virtue of its totalitarian government, the freedoms of its citizenry are severely restricted; and at the same time, its politicians maintain unequal and extensive powers that far exceed the concessions and privileges granted to the general Chinese populace.

Rawls second principle of justice; or the “difference principle” is subdivided into two parts. It states that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantage[d], consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Denise 320). In the first part of this principle, Rawls discusses certain conditions in which socio-economic inequalities are to be deemed acceptable. He argues that socio-economic inequalities are justifiable to the extent that they serve to the benefit of those that are the least well-off. Thus, for example, if a particular government was to establish a policy that decreased the tax burden on wealthy entrepreneurs, that policy would be deemed justifiable if these individuals in turn were stimulated by the tax decrease to craft and construct new products that would serve to the benefit of even the poorest members of the community. The second part of Rawls’ difference principle can be understood as requiring that all positions in the social hierarchy be filled by fair and equal competition. Thus, Rawls would likely perceive the acquiring of a prominent corporate position by an individual with familial ties to the head of that organization to evidence the existence of an unjust society.

Rawls concludes his argument by noting some additional procedures that must be followed after the principles of justice have been decided upon by the people’s representatives. First, the principles must be “publicly justified,” or defended openly and honestly in front of those who are represented by them (D’Agostino 5). They must then be ratified in the setting of a constitutional meeting, within which deliberators must choose a particular constitution that adheres to the principles of justice. After this constitution is chosen, representatives must establish laws in agreement with the concepts embodied in the just constitution; putting the principles within it into practice.

I will now consider why is it that I believe Rawls’ theory of justice places the socio-economic inequalities inherent to capitalism in a positive light, and why I believe the Marxian communist revolution to be the only true way for capitalist societies to establish social justice and moral equality. Rawls states that practices based on inequalities are justified insofar as they serve to the “advantage of every person engaging in it” (Denise 324). However in making this assertion, Rawls does not differentiate between the degree to which the most advantaged will gain vis-à-vis the least advantaged. For instance, if a particular law were to improve upon the well-being of the best-off members of society, and only minimally improve upon the quality of life of the worst-off members of society; that law would nevertheless be deemed to adhere to the Rawlsian principles of justice. In accord with this understanding, it seems as though Rawls would deem vast income gaps between the rich and poor that develop under capitalism to be justifiable, so long as the existing hierarchy serves to improve ever so slightly upon the lives of the poor. Accordingly, Rawls’ theory seems to justify capitalism by placing certain minimum conditions upon it that place it in a more humane light. However, true social justice and moral equality cannot be derived in a system whereby the rich get substantially richer, while the impoverished become only slightly less poor than they started. On the other hand, Marx’s conception of the communist revolution provides a clear path for the subjugated members of society to fully and honestly overcome their subordinated position. Thus, the only way for justice to take hold in capitalist societies is for the subjugated proletariat class to unite together to overthrow the existing socio-economic polity and establish a new state in the name of true equality. Only then will the “original and free development of individuals [cease] to be a mere phase;” and will true justice and moral equality will flourish (Denise 202).

In conclusion, both Karl Marx and John Rawls establish cognizant and well-argued positions in defense of their views on morality and justice. In Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx makes the case that morality is a mere ideology designed to further the objectives of the dominant class; placing his argument into the context of the capitalist division of labor. He argues that true social justice and equality is achieved at the point in which the members of the subordinated social class unite together and abolish the conditions that foster their inferior existence. In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls establishes a universalized theory of justice; deriving at certain principles that must be adhered to if a society is to be truly just. It is argued that Rawls’ conception of social justice merely serves to justify capitalism and perpetuate the socio-economic inequalities that it propagates. Instead, the Marxist communist revolution must be undergone in order for true social justice and moral equality to ensue. Thoughtful consideration of the ethical doctrines of Karl Marx and John Rawls can lead one to a greater understanding of notions of justice and morality. This recognition can help formulate a knowledgeable and critically minded citizenry; capable of affecting societal change for the better.

Works Cited:

D’ Agostino, Fred. "Public Justification." Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1997. Universiteit Van Amsterdam. 4 May 2007 <http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/archives/fall1997/entries/justification-public/>.

Denise, Theodore C., Nicholas P. White, and Sheldon P. Peterfreund. Great Traditions in Ethics. 11th ed. Vol. 1. Belmont, CA: Thomson Learning, Inc., 2005. 192-330.

Marx, Karl. "Theses on Feuerbach." Marxists Internet Archive. Trans. Cyril Smith. 2002. Marxists Internet Archive. 4 May 2007 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/theses/index.htm>. [cited in text as Marx A]

Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. "The Communist Manifesto." Comp. Rick Kuhn. 07 Oct. 2005. Australian National University. <http://www.anu.edu.au/polsci/marx/classics/manifesto.html>. [cited in text as Marx B]

Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Rev. ed. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999. Google Books. 4 May 2007 <http://books.google.com/books?id=b7GZr5Btp30C&printsec=frontcover&dq=A+theory+of+justice>.

Vaggalis, Ted. "John Rawls's Political Liberalism." Academic Dialogue on Applied Ethics. 1994. Drury College. 4 May 2007 <http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/Forum/meta/background/Rawls_pl.html>.

Who Was Milton Friedman? - Brian Safran

         In Who Was Milton Friedman?, Paul Krugman sets out to define the legacy of contemporary American economist Milton Friedman. In his writing, Krugman identifies some of the salient features of the historical context within which Freidman developed his ideas and which subsequently led to their ascendance in status to become a respected alternative to the Keynesian economic doctrine of the mid-twentieth century. Krugman examines Friedman’s view of human behavior and how it led him to the economic principles which formed the foundation of Monetarism. He concludes by arguing that while the intellectual climate and public opinion were ripe for the acceptance of Monetarism in the late twentieth century, certain economic occurrences in recent years can demonstrate the limitations of Friedman’s theory and can lead one to conclude that a “counter-counterreformation” against Monetarism is in order (Krugman 2007: 13). Two years after the article was written one can see that Krugman’s recommendations have largely come into fruition as evidenced by the measures taken by the United States and countries across the globe in response to the ongoing worldwide economic crisis.

Krugman begins his article by examining the socio-political zeitgeist within which Milton Friedman lived, thought and wrote. Although the early part of the twentieth century had been dominated by classical, free-market economics, by the middle of the century, Keynesianism had risen to prominence for its offering of both a salient explanation of and pragmatic solution to the Great Depression. (Krugman 2007: 1) However, by the later part of the century, classical economics was able to regain much of its lost esteem thanks in large part to the influence of Friedman and his assertions. (Krugman 2007: 1) Friedman’s influence was founded on his articulateness and ability to “correctly identif[y] Keynesianism’s weak points” (Krugman 2007: 2).

Whereas Keynesianism had sought to distance economic analysis from the rationalism of a hypothetical “economic man” and move towards attributing economic behavior to psychological considerations, Friedman instead believed that an “economic man” can in fact be identified irrespective of individual or group psychology (Krugman 2007: 3). Although economic models such as the Phillips Curve had previously lent support to the Keynesian notion of inflation as a necessary consequence of efforts to reduce unemployment, having presented inflation and unemployment as trade-offs, Friedman instead argued that this perceived trade-off was only temporary. (Krugman 2007: 3) In making his case, Friedman attributed the role of the “economic man” in arguing that in the long run, both inflation and unemployment can rise concomitantly (Krugman 2007: 4). He argued that while in the short-run, employers may perceive an increase in wages in response to rising inflation which may encourage the hiring of additional workers, with time, those workers will come to demand higher wages even before the full effect of inflation has been borne out by prices in the marketplace (Krugman 2007: 4). Therefore, even in a situation of rising inflation, in the long-run, employer’s expectations of rational employee and consumer behavior may actually serve to encourage reductions in the workforce. (Krugman 2007: 4). Thus, in effect, Friedman made the case that Keynesian advocacy of government spending, which encourages inflation and a temporary improvement to employment statistics, is not in the long-run the best mechanism for solving economic crises and for putting people back to work.

A major divergence between Friedman’s ideas and Keynesianism was with regards to the role of the money supply. Keynes had argued that an increase in the money supply had a negligible effect on improving an economy ravaged by a depression as interest rates in such an economy are already very low. (Krugman 2007: 5) In a situation where cheap loans are readily available, a further increase in the money supply was not believed to have a sufficiently beneficial effect on the economy, and as such, fiscal policy was advocated as the most effective means to reinvigorate an ailing economy. (Krugman 2007: 5) However, Friedman took issue with this assertion. As proof, he and his fellow Monetarists went on to argue that it was flawed monetary policy which caused the Great Depression. If the overall money supply had been increased and the government had stepped in to aid failing banks, the banks would have continued to loan and individuals would have been encouraged to hold onto bank deposits rather than seeking to convert their deposits into cash. (Krugman 2007: 6)

While during the post-war period Keynesianism had become the doctrine of the day and Friedman’s Monetarist approach had been regarded with disdain, the 1970s saw the emergence of sustained inflation unlike that of the past, and this afforded Friedman and his followers a breeding ground in which to test their hypotheses. (Krugman 2007: 4, 5) For the first time in recent history, inflation and unemployment seemed to share a direct correlation during this period. In addition to double-digit inflation, this period saw unemployment figures that were the most devastating since the Great Depression. (Krugman 2007: 4) Thus, the emergence of stagflation, as it came to be called, had its roots in the theoretical propositions set forth by Friedman and his followers and which stood in contradistinction to that which would have been predicted by the Keynesian philosophy of the day. (Krugman 2007: 4) Having demonstrated that its theoretical tenants could withstand empirical testing, in the 1970s the Monetarist perspective advanced by Friedman saw a windfall of newfound credibility. (Krugman 2007: 4)

Although many came to prescribe to Monetarist thought, Paul Krugman makes several points in his article arguing that much of this support was founded on unexamined misconceptions. For example, he criticized Friedman for his having fueled the widespread public misperception that Monetarism advocated a withdrawal of government from individual affairs. (Krugman 2007: 7) Rather, Krugman argues that Friedman and his followers were actually advocating an increase in government intervention- only in a different form than that with which the public had become accustomed. (Krugman 2007: 7) Another such criticism surrounds the assertion of Monetarists that the validity of their perspective can be demonstrated by considering their explanation of the Great Depression. Monetarists assert that a fall in the money supply was responsible for the Great Depression, and that its consequences could have been averted had the U.S. government increased its money supply and had the Federal Reserve acted quickly to lend money to failing banks. (Krugman 2007: 6, 7) Krugman notes that the flaw in this explanation reveals itself when one differentiates between the “monetary base,” which the Fed directly controls and the supply of which was actually increasing during the Great Depression, and the “money supply,” which includes deposits over which the government has no control (Krugman 2007: 6, 7). Furthermore, the idea that because the government “could have” taken measures which would have reduced the overall consequences of the Great Depression, this statement does not inevitably lead to the heavily promoted and often Monetarist-attributed conclusion that because such measures were not taken, the U.S. government necessarily “caused” the crisis itself (Krugman 2007: 6).

Krugman also argues that empirical evidence can demonstrate that Monetarism is ineffectual in bringing about its desired ends. For example, despite efforts in both the United States and Great Britain to increase the money supply at the end of the 1970s and start of the 1980s, these efforts did not serve to thwart deep recessions. (Krugman 2007: 7) The same is true with respect to Japan, wherein efforts to introduce Monetarist policy during the Asian Financial Crisis were proven ineffectual in restoring consumer confidence. (Krugman 2007: 8) Additionally, despite Friedman’s criticism that central banks should refrain from micromanaging the economy, since the 1980s, their contributions have actually served to soften recessions and reduce inflation. (Krugman 2007: 7) In the United States, Krugman attributes the relatively smaller gains in living standards after the introduction of Monetarist policy in the mid-1970s to increasing income inequality, a prospect which stands in contradiction to Friedman’s belief that no special protections would be necessary to ensure income equality under a Monetarist framework. (Krugman 2007: 9) Finally, a similar claim can be made with respect to Latin America, where Friedman-esque neoliberal policies have largely failed to spurn the economic growth and income equality that Monetarists promise. (Krugman 2007: 10) While the promotion of laissez-faire economics may in certain circumstances be appropriate, Krugman argues that Friedman’s greatest theoretical flaw is his unbridled, absolutist advocacy of deregulation. (Krugman 2007: 11) He ultimately concludes that just as a shift in public discourse led to a “counterreformation” against Keynesianism, perhaps what is needed now is yet another “counter-counterrevolution” against Monetarism (Krugman 2007: 12).

Krugman’s criticisms of Friedman and of his Monetarist perspective have continuing validity with respect to the modern financial crisis. Perhaps most striking is the fact that the 2008 arguably Monetarist-inspired large-scale “Troubled Asset Relief Program” aimed at rescuing failing banks has largely failed in its efforts to stimulate the underlying economy (FRB 2009: 1).  Despite government efforts to pump hundreds of billions of dollars into the ailing financial sector, unemployment rates in the United States rose from 6.0 percent in October, 2008 to 10.2 percent in October, 2009. (BLS 2009: 1) As a result of these failings, it can be argued that the United States has moved in a Keynesian direction against the backdrop of the previously-dominant Monetarist perspective. The 2009 Obama Stimulus Plan evidences a shift in thinking among political leaders, as its ultimate aims are not targeted at questions of monetary policy, but rather are aimed at direct fiscal spending to spurn the creation of jobs. Although certain economic indicators have shown signs of improvement, it is unclear whether they are signaling a rebound of the economy. (Flood 2009: 1) Similar measures are being taken abroad, such as China’s decision 2008 decision to authorize a five-hundred eighty-six billion dollar stimulus package aimed at providing direct government funding for infrastructure, agriculture, health care and other social welfare objectives. (Batson 2008: 1) While an end to the crisis will not prove the validity of one theory over the other, it certainly appears as though the current situation is providing a framework for policy-makers to carefully examine the consequences of Keynesian and Monetarist philosophy.

In conclusion, Milton Friedman was an influential modern economist who founded the so-called Monetarist school of thought, a perspective which gained traction in the late 1970s and early 1980s as an alternative to the previously-dominant Keynesian economic perspective of the day.  By disputing the theoretical proposition advanced by Keynes that inflation, brought about by fiscal spending, is a necessary evil in efforts to reduce unemployment and by focusing on the ability of policy-makers to increase the money supply during times of recession and depression, Friedman was able to create an intellectual movement in opposition to the Keynesian tax-and-spend model. Despite initial evidence from the 1970s suggesting that Friedman’s assertions had a degree of validity with respect to his assertions surrounding stagflation, in Who Was Milton Friedman?, Paul Krugman details a number of occurrences which demonstrate that Monetarist-inspired policies have not been shown to achieve their desired ends, and he advances the idea that a counter-revolution against Monetarism is in order. By analyzing the policy responses to the current global economic crisis, one can see that such a counter-revolution seems to be forming. If and when the economy rebounds, those on either side of the debate will inevitably argue that the policies in line with their perspective were the cause of the improvement, and as such, it is unclear which side will emerge as dominant in the coming years. However, what cannot be doubted is that the modern economic crisis is reinvigorating the debate between Keynesianism and Monetarism.

Works Cited:

Batson, Andrew. "China Sets Big Stimulus Plan In Bid to Jump-Start Growth." The Wall Street Journal. The Wall Street Journal, 10 Nov. 2008. Web. 25 Nov. 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122623724868611327.html>.

Flood, Chris. "Economic outlook: Fed likely to upgrade its growth projections." Financial Times. The Financial Times Limited, 22 Nov. 2009. Web. 25 Nov. 2009. <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1d5eb9e-d623-11de-b80f-00144feabdc0.html>.

Krugman, Paul. "Who Was Milton Friedman?” The New York Review of Books Vol. 54, No. 2. (2007): 1-13. Who Was Milton Friedman? The New York Times, 15 Feb. 2007. Web. 25 Nov. 2009. <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19857>.

United States. United States Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Table A-1. Employment status of the civilian population by sex and age. United States Department of Labor, 6 Nov. 2009. Web. 25 Nov. 2009. <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t01.htm>. [cited in text as BLS].

United States. Federal Reserve. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Information. Federal Reserve, 6 Nov. 2009. Web. 25 Nov. 2009. <http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm>. [cited in text as Federal Reserve].