In A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus
and the Anglo-American Post-War Settlement, G. John Ikenberry analyzes the
factors which led Britain and the United States to reach agreement on the basic
rules of a redesigned international financial system following World War II.
Whereas each country was beset by political cleavages and divergent interests
so deep that one might have believed consensus to be a futile goal, Ikenberry
argues that the predominating factor which encouraged and ultimately resulted in
the post-war settlement was the emergence of a “middle ground” brought about by
a group of intellectuals, economists and policy experts who despite their
geo-political happenstance, were united by a shared set of theoretical
conceptions based on a shared professional outlook (Ikenberry 1992: 291). He
argues that this shared scholarly perspective came to become accepted by the
two governments, and ultimately encouraged the formation of coalition-building
within each state around these theoretical tenants, providing a foundation for
the development of a public consensus. (Ikenberry 1992: 321) Analysis of
Ikenberry’s findings can demonstrate that the consensus formulated by scholars
had the effect of nurturing a Machiavellian conception of power based on consent,
which helped to propel the United States into a position of hegemony in the
post-war period.
Ikenberry begins his investigation
by setting forth the socio-political context within which the governments of
Britain and the United States found themselves in the post-war era, and the
objectives each sought to pursue through their economic policy. Whereas the
United States was generally interested in pursuing a new international
financial system based on the principles of multilateralism and free trade, Britain
generally sought bilateral trade policies and the continuance of “preferential
economic groupings” in an effort to fulfill its desire to provide for full
employment (Ikenberry 1992: 289). Additionally, in each country there were
stark divisions among political actors who supported opposed interests. In
Britain, conservatives supported the continuance of the “imperial preference
system” which provided for preferential duties on goods sold within the British
Empire, whereas liberals supported restrictions on trade to ensure the
stability of the welfare state (Ikenberry 1992: 305, 310). In the United
States, prominent views included New Deal economic planners who supported
Keynesian intervention in the economy, the State Department which supported the
opening of the international trading system, the Treasury, which focused on
monetary intervention, and the Congress, which was “domestically minded” and
opposed to the expansion of free-trade (Ikenberry 1992: 305, 308, 316).
In the midst of these competing views
both within and between the countries on each side of the Atlantic, consensus
was finally reached with the memorializing of the Bretton Woods Agreement.
Ikenberry’s main question of analysis was to discern how it was that the two
countries were able to reach a seemingly miraculous level of cooperation
despite the opposed interests each polity brought to the negotiating table.
Although past explanations have focused on the pursuit of power and
self-interest at the state level, he finds that such an explanation fails to
explain why the specific features of the international economic order arose as
they did, and what served as the “glue” that helped sustain an Anglo-American
coalition despite the seemingly opposed national and bureaucratic interests
(Ikenberry 1992: 291).
His answer to these questions lied
in his belief that this “glue” was provided by a group of economic policy
specialists and experts on both sides of the Atlantic who provided a framework
for postwar consensus by shifting the focus from trade issues to
less-contentious monetary issues and articulating a set of common objectives
(Ikenberry 1992: 291). These specialists did not constitute an “epistemic
community,” or an independently-operating, apolitical scientific community, but
rather, were a group of scholars brought into their respective governments
during the negotiating process (Ikenberry 1992: 293, 304). Furthermore,
although policy-makers often deferred their decision-making to those they
perceived as “experts,” the common ideas these specialists espoused were not
based on their support of specific scientific, empirical or logical doctrines,
but rather were rooted in their normative “professional orientation,” composed
of an assimilation of beliefs formed in reaction to recent upheavals in the
world economy (Ikenberry 1992: 293, 297, 318). The tenants of this professional
consensus included the support of policies aimed at currency stability and
currency convertibility, approval of short-term fiscal expansion to correct
trade imbalances, and support of the idea of creating a global economy with
international oversight over national economic policies. (Ikenberry 1992:
297-98) Scholars found themselves able to “break through various layers of
conflict” by focusing initially on monetary cooperation (Ikenberry 1992: 319). Ultimately, Ikenberry shows how the policy
recommendations espoused by these scholars culminated with the Bretton Woods
Agreement, a compromise which created an international financial system
combining aspects of Keynesian economic policy and social welfare objectives
with free trade. (Ikenberry 1992: 292, 294, 315)
In focusing on the concessions the
United States made to Britain in its design of the new international financial
order through the guise of policy experts demonstrates how the United States
government sought to put into effect a Machiavellian-type view of power by
balancing the interests of consent and coercion. Ikenberry argues that there
was a sense among American officials that it was in their best interest to
refrain from presenting the appearance that they were imposing a post-war order
on Europe, and in doing so, sought the support of British elites. (Ikenberry
1992: 320) Among the most prominent concessions the United States made to the
British included their providing for greater national flexibility in the
management of exchange rates, and the articulation of a “middle ground” between
a free trade system and a bilateral or regional trading arrangement (Ikenberry
1992: 315, 319). As a result of these concessions, the various
previously-opposed groups including Keynesian planners, free traders and
internationalists all joined in support of Bretton Woods, seeing it as a system
from which all can benefit. (Ikenberry 1992: 317) Thus, through the making of
Machiavellian-style concessions to British elites in the development of a
cross-Atlantic consensus, the United States was able to secure Britain as an
active and willing participant in the systematization of U.S. ascendance to and
Britain’s fall from global hegemony.
In closing, In A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American
Post-War Settlement, G. John Ikenberry offers a perspective on how it came
to be that the United States and Britain were able to find common ground in the
post-World War II era. Despite the fact that each country was beset by external
and internal political cleavages, Ikenberry argues that consensus was forged
primarily due to the influence of a group of scholars who shared a common
professional outlook and way of thinking. It is through the suggestions offered
by these scholars that their respective national governments formulated policy.
In culminating the Bretton Woods Agreement, the governments of the United
States and Britain incorporated a range of ideas appealing to the elites of
both countries. Furthermore, by putting into effect a Machiavellian-type view
of power, and making certain concessions to British elites, the United States
was able to design a new international financial system which propelled them
into a position of global hegemon. It is without question that the world would
look quite differently than it does today if it had not been for the influence
of the well-positioned scholars and policy experts who played a significant
role in formulating a redesign of the global economic post-war order.
Works Cited:
Ikenberry, G.
John. "A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the Anglo-American
Postwar Settlement." International Organization 46.1 (1992):
289-321. Print.
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