In
Robert Kagan’s The Return of History and the End of Dreams and Fareed
Zakaria’s The Post-American World, two very different perspectives of
the twenty-first century world order are presented. Each author comes to
contrasting conclusions regarding the continuance of U.S. hegemony, and the
challenges facing the United States with respect to its foreign policy, its
role in the global economy, and the continuance of the supremacy of its
democratic model as a source of stability, peace and development in the world.
The authors also differ in their views of the potential threat the U.S. faces
from the ascent of emerging powers, and place differing degrees of emphasis on
the role of soft power, globalization and transnational actors such as Islamic
terrorists and civil society in shaping the twenty-first century world. In the end,
each author offers differing prescriptions to U.S. leaders in their efforts to
effectuate a response that best serves U.S. interests. Analyzing each author’s
diagnosis of and prescriptions for America and its place in the twenty-first
century through the lens of international relations theory offers keen insight
into the nature of their claims and allows one to better understand the bases
for their positions.
Kagan approaches his analysis of the twenty-first century
world order from the perspective of realism. As such, Kagan’s findings reveal a
belief in a politics reflective of a universal human nature characterized by a
preoccupation with individual well-being relative to others; a system of
anarchy at the international level characterized by the absence of an
overarching world government; a conviction that there exists a permanent
security dilemma and that progress at the international level similar to the
domestic is impossible; a belief in balance of power politics, or that rapid
changes in a state’s power or status will provoke counterbalancing actions; and
in the primacy of national security and survival as the normative core driving
foreign policy. (Coelho A 2010) On the other hand, Zakaria’s analysis flows
from the liberal perspective. Accordingly, his analysis is reflective of the
core tenants and assumptions of liberalism; namely, a positive view of human
nature, a conviction that international relations can be cooperative rather
than conflictual through the creation of international institutions, and a
belief in the capacity for progress at the international level. (Coelho B 2010)
Kagan and Zakaria differ in their views of whether the United
States will maintain its hegemony in the twenty-first century global order.
Kagan argues that American hegemony is “unlikely to fade anytime soon, largely
because much of the world doesn’t want it to” (Kagan 2008: 86). He bases his
argument on a belief that U.S. relations with its democratic allies in Europe,
Asia and the Middle East have been strengthened in recent years, whereas China
and Russia have failed to effectively organize themselves into a united
alliance capable of countering the United States- indicative of a realist’s
belief that “states will ally to protect themselves from stronger ones and therefore
form and reform a balance of power” (Kagan 2008: 86-87, 89; Snyder 2004: 56) Kagan attributes the growing support of U.S.
geopolitical primacy to rising global fears of the emergence of regional
powers, further evidencing a realist belief in balance of power politics (Kagan
2008: 91). Ultimately, Kagan portrays U.S. dominance as having a stabilizing
effect on global affairs (Kagan 2008: 95) On the other hand, Zakaria sees the
twenty-first century as the end of America’s “golden age” (Zakaria 2009: xi).
Whereas Zakaria believes the United States will likely maintain its
militaristic hegemony into the future, he finds that in every other area-
industrial, financial, educational, social or cultural- the distribution of
power is shifting. (Zakaria 2009: 4) He emphasizes the “rise of the rest,”
focusing on emerging powers and the economic, political, military and cultural
implications of their ascent (Zakaria 2009: xxiii, 2). Ultimately, he sees the
United States’ failure to provide “leadership” in designing a system of
international institutions that gives emerging powers a “stake in the system”
to be the inciting factor of the post-American world. (Zakaria 2009: xxix). His
view of international institutions as capable of providing for stability
suggests his support of the liberal belief that international relations can be
cooperative rather than conflictual. (Coelho B 2010)
The two authors offer opposing views regarding the most
significant challenges to U.S. foreign policy. Kagan sees the most significant threats
to the U.S. and its position within the existing global order to be the
“reemergence of the great autocratic powers,” along with the rise of “Islamic
radicalism” (Kagan 2008: 105). Kagan suggests that the United States must work
to maintain the present “favorable strategic balance” by preventing the spread
of nuclear weapons to Iran, which would have the effect of “transform[ing] the
strategic equation in the region” (Kagan 2008: 90). Kagan characterizes Islamic
terrorists as harboring “nationalist resentment” not so unlike that of the
Chinese, Russians or Indians- each of whom have a “desire for respect” and a
“yearning for honor” (Kagan 2008: 48). On the other hand, Zakaria sees Islamic
terrorism as a fading threat and cites as evidence the lack of a “major attack
anywhere” in the years following September 11th and the falling support
throughout the Muslim world for bin Laden and his violent tactics (Zakaria
2009: 13) Instead, Zakaria sees the biggest challenge to the U.S. as
globalization and the decline of its
“relative economic weight” by the emergence of rising powers, as well as
“rising mass passions,” or nationalist sentiment aimed at “reshaping” the
status quo (Zakaria 2009: 33, 36, 40-41). With respect to U.S. foreign policy,
Zakaria finds the chief challenge to be the necessity that the U.S. strike a
difficult balance between “deterring China” from rogue actions, and
“accommodating its legitimate growth” (Zakaria 2009: 44, 236) Kagan’s overall
focus on the militaristic threats to U.S. national security demonstrates his
realist belief in the primacy of national security and survival as forming the
normative core driving foreign policy. (Coelho A 2010) On the other hand,
Zakaria’s focus on the peaceful economic threat facing the United States evidences
his liberal belief in a positive view of human nature and a conviction that
“trade and finance forge ties between nations,” in mitigation of the “anarchic
world the realists envision” (Coelho B 2010; Snyder 2004: 56).
Kagan and Zakaria also set forth differing perspectives with
respect to the role of the global market in the twenty-first century. Although
both Zakaria and Kagan see the market as an arena of geopolitical contest, the
two come to differing conclusions on whether that contest will result in war.
Kagan focuses his analysis on the effect of the market on empowering states
with the means of war. He finds that powers such as China, Russia, Japan and
India have sought to enhance their economic standing, and enhance their
military capabilities in tandem. (Kagan 2008: 11-12, 15) These findings suggest
a realist belief that human beings have an “innate desire to dominate others,”
and that war is a “inevitable, and indeed sometimes necessary, form of state
activity” (Walt 1998: 2; Mearscheimer 1995: 48) On the other hand, although
Zakaria finds geopolitics to remain “a struggle for influence and control,” he
sees the market as ushering in a peaceful end of American hegemony in the midst
of globalization and the economic “rise of the rest” (Zakaria 2009: xxi, 2,
44-45). Rather than viewing the “power shift” as a cause for war, Zakaria
simply predicts a revised role for the United States centered on “consultation,
cooperation and even compromise” (Zakaria 2009: 2, 233). Whereas Kagan’s view
of the market would be indicative of the premium realists place on national
security and state survival, Zakaria’s view would comport with the liberal view
that international relations can be cooperative rather than conflictual, that
progress by reason and rationality is possible and that conflict and war are
not inevitable. (Coelho A 2010; Coelho B 2010)
Kagan and Zakaria also have differing views on whether
democratization will continue to serve as a model for stability, peace and
development. Kagan finds that the existence of powerful challengers to
democracy indicates that we have not yet seen the ideological “end of history”
(Kagan 2008: 53-54). For instance, Russia advances an autocratic regime which
seeks to “implement the popular will” without competitive elections, and the
actions taken by its political leaders to restore “greatness to Russia” have
been met with widespread support, whereas China’s leaders, never having had the
intent to “reform [themselves] out of power,” have in recent years sought to
consolidate the power of the Chinese autocracy based on the regime’s “profound
concern for its own survival” (Kagan 2008: 54-56). Kagan argues that while in
the long run, rising economic prosperity may induce political liberalism, he
notes that the wait may be “too long to have any strategic or geopolitical
relevance” (Kagan 2008: 57). In the end, Kagan notes that the emergence of
powerful autocracies will lead to a period of “growing tensions and sometimes
confrontation between the forces of democracy and the forces of autocracy”
(Kagan 2008: 58). On the other hand, Zakaria finds that democracy will maintain
its prominent status as a model for stability, peace and development. He cites
as evidence a 2007 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, which “showed a remarkable
increase worldwide in positive views about free trade, markets and democracy”
(Zakaria 2009: 47). Zakaria also finds that with respect to China, “it is too
soon to tell” whether China will prove to be an exception to the theory that
capitalism begets democracy, noting that the regime will “almost certainly face
challenges over the next fifteen years” (Zakaria 2009: 100-01). He concludes that,
with very few exceptions, non-democratic states have failed to attain a
Western-level of economic development. (Zakaria 2009: 102) Zakaria attributes
the economic rise of India to the existence of its “genuine private sector,
established rights of property and contract, independent courts, and the rule
of law” (Zakaria 2009: 134). Whereas Kagan’s view of autocratic regimes as
providing a plausible alternative to democracy comports with a realist’s
emphasis on state survival and the national interest as being the final
arbiters of all of a state’s affairs, and of the central goal of state to be to
“maximize relative power,” Zakaria’s perspective indicates a liberal
characterization of the state as an underwriter of liberty and a belief that
“economic interdependence [will] discourage states from using force against
each other because warfare [will] threaten each side’s prosperity” (Coelho A
2010; Mearsheimer 1995: 48; Coelho B 2010; Walt 1998: 3).
The authors also differ on their views regarding the future
prospects of U.S. relations vis-à-vis emerging powers such as China, India and
Russia. With respect to China, Kagan argues that its “booming economy” has
given Chinese leaders a “not unreasonable feeling that the future belongs to
them” (Kagan 2008: 27). In addition to its unprecedented economic growth, China
is also in the midst of “construct[ing] a military force that is commensurate
with China’s status and up to the job of defending the interests of China’s
development” (Kagan 2008: 28). Spoken as a true realist, Kagan notes that just
as “all rising powers throughout history,” the Chinese fear “the rest of the
world will conspire against them” (Kagan 2008: 31). Kagan notes that China has
substantially increased its military spending, and has “shifted its strategic
doctrine away from defending the homeland against foreign invasion and toward a
strategy of projecting force overseas” (Kagan 2008: 29). Kagan finds that
increasingly, the U.S. has called for “greater transparency” with respect to
the extent of China’s military growth and of its intentions (Kagan 2008: 31)
Kagan emphasizes the possibility of war between China and the United States
emerging over Taiwan, an issue which drives at China deep-seeded “national
pride and honor” and embodies “American post-Cold War ideological hostility and
strategic opposition” (Kagan 2008: 36). Kagan’s findings comport with the
realist view of power as the central preoccupation of politics and the view
that effective political leaders must, “in times of peace…thin[k] of methods of
warfare,” and of the primacy of national security and state survival as the
core values upon which a state’s foreign policy is grounded (Coelho A 2010;
Machiavelli 1910: 31).
Zakaria however, finds war to be an unlikely prospect for
Sino-American relations. He sees China primarily seeking to “avoid picking a
fight with other governments,” with its primary “focus remain[ing] on growth”
(Zakaria 2009: 105). Zakaria notes that in recent years, China’s leaders have
increasingly sought to implement the perspective that “a nation’s path to
greatness lies in its economic prowess and that militarism, empire, and
aggression lead to a dead end” (Zakaria 2009: 107). Additionally, Zakaria
argues that China has been effective in promoting its “soft power,” or “the
attractiveness of its ideas” which has led it to amicable relations with
several countries in Africa and Asia (Zakaria 2009: 108, 119). He also notes
that while China has “long avoided multilateral institutions,” it has
increasingly sought to involve itself in several of them (Zakaria 2009: 120).
Finally, with respect to Taiwan, Zakaria notes that China has in recent years
“switched to a smarter, less aggressive course,” characterized by an effort to
increase “Taiwan’s dependence on the mainland” (Zakaria 2009: 123).
Furthermore, despite the claims of some that the Chinese military is a threat
to U.S. security, Zakaria finds that China maintains a defense budget that is
less than ten percent of that of the U.S., and that it lacks any
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and has relatively few nuclear missiles.
(Zakaria 2009: 126) In the end, Zakaria finds that “the goal for China is not
conflict but the avoidance of conflict” (Zakaria 2009: 127). Therefore, Zakaria
sees primarily stable and beneficial relations between the U.S. and China in
the twenty-first century, and his views evidence his support of the interdependence
liberal perspective in that economic development and free trade promotes
transnational ties which ultimately can lead to peace, as well as the
institutional liberal perspective which sees a high level of
institutionalization as a source of peace and stability. (Coelho B 2010)
With respect to India, Kagan notes
that while previously, Indian officials “expressed contempt for great power politics,”
the 1990s ushered in a new era in which the country has had a “drive for power”
(Kagan 2008: 41-42). Kagan points to India’s efforts in the late-1990s to join
the nuclear club. (Kagan 2008: 42) To him, India’s ambitions for nuclear
weapons are rooted in its “strategic concerns” about the possibility of
conflict with Pakistan or China. (Kagan 2008: 42). Its ultimate endeavor has
been to protect its primacy in South Asia, preserve a favorable balance of
power in Asia, and play the role of “swing state” in the global arena (Kagan
2008: 43). With respect to Indo-U.S. relations, Kagan notes that the formation
of temporary and shifting “formal and informal alliances” between, on one side,
China and Pakistan, and on the other, India, Japan and the United States
indicates that India is increasingly allying with the United States in order to
hedge against China (Kagan 2008: 45-46). In this respect, Kagan’s analysis
evidences the traditional realist assumption of a politics in which the pursuit
of power is its central preoccupation, and in balance of power politics as a
key method of achieving stability in an anarchic world. (Coelho A 2010) On the
contrary, Zakaria finds that India since 1997 has been “peaceful, stable and
prosperous” (Zakaria 2009: 129). He notes that in modern times, India has seen
the “fires of secession and militant nationalism…di[e] down,” “national and
state governments chang[e] hands without incident,” a “thaw in [it’s]
perennially tense relations with Pakistan” a “transformation of the Indian
economy” and its embrace of the “free market” which has taken many out of the
throws of poverty (Zakaria 2009: 130-31). Furthermore, Zakaria notes the
emergence of a globally-oriented, cosmopolitan Indian citizenry reflective of
“the birth of India as a independent society- boisterous, colorful, open,
vibrant and above all, ready for change” (Zakaria 2009: 138). He finds that in
the post-Cold War era, India abandoned its “rough-minded” and “shrewd” foreign
policies in favor of improving its relations with its neighbors and with the
United States (Zakaria 2009: 149-50). As a result, Zakaria claims that India is
“poised to become a great power at last” (Zakaria 2009: 150). Furthermore,
although Zakaria acknowledges the geopolitical strategy behind India’s nuclear
program, he also suggests that it serves as a source of “national pride”
against the backdrop of its refusal to consent to the nuclear non-proliferation
regime it sees as biased in favor of China (Zakaria 2009: 159-60). Therefore,
Zakaria’s analysis follows in the path of interdependence liberalism to the
extent that greater interdependence between India and the rest of the world in
the form of transnational ties can be a source of peace, and in sociological
liberalism by suggesting that that the rise of a new global cosmopolitan
citizenry brings about a more peaceful world through the addition of “material
incentives to moral commitments” (Coelho B 2010; Doyle 1986: 1161).
With respect to Russia, Kagan sees a
“zone of competition” emerging in Western Eurasia, where increasingly “a
contest for influence is underway” between the European Union and Russia, the
latter of which can “manipulate the flow of energy supplies” to the region
(Kagan 2008: 12-13). By way of its natural resource possessions, its disposable
wealth and its veto power in the UN Security Council, Russia finds itself able
to “play European nations off against one another,” and has emerged as a
significant player “on every international issue” (Kagan 2008: 15, 23). Today,
Russia’s “grand ambition” is to “undo the post-Cold War settlement and to
reestablish Russia as a dominant power” (Kagan 2008: 17). Based on the old
realist adage that “nations have no permanent friends, only permanent
interests,” Russia does not merely seek an invite into the “western club”- it
wants to enter that club on an equal plane to the United States and now China
(Kagan 2008: 17). Whereas Kagan focuses an entire section of his book on
Russia’s geo-political objectives, Zakaria focuses relatively little of his writing
on Russia’s geopolitics. Instead, Zakaria focuses on Russia’s economic system,
seeing it as “much closer to the global capitalist norm than [it’s] economic
syste[m]…a generation ago” (Zakaria 2009: 30). This discrepancy indicates
Kagan’s realist belief that international relations is inherently conflictual
and a perennial war “of every man, against every man,” whereas Zakaria’s
approach demonstrates a liberal belief that “the benefits of trade can be
enjoyed only under conditions of peace” (Coelho A 2010; Hobbes 1909: 37; Coelho
B 2010; Doyle 1986: 1151).
While the forgoing analysis may
suggest that Zakaria represents a liberal thinker and Kagan a realist, it is
important to note that political thinkers often draw their philosophical
findings from a variety of different theoretical perspectives. For example,
each author suggested several prescriptions for American foreign policy which
would appear to contradict their earlier analysis. For instance, Kagan
suggested that America seek the establishment of a “global concert,” or “league
of democracies” with the aim of “signal[ing] a commitment to the democratic
idea” (Kagan 2008: 97). Further, Kagan suggests a U.S. “strategy of democracy
promotion,” acceleration of the pace of “modernization” and “globalization,”
and its continued promotion of “political liberalization” (Kagan 2008: 101).
These views fall very much in line with liberal notions of a view of the world
as it should be and not as it is, a belief that international relations can be
cooperative rather than conflictual, and a belief that modernization can spurn
such cooperation. (Coelho B 2010)
Similarly, Zakaria sets forth six recommendations for the
U.S. in a post-American world; namely, the necessity that the U.S. set
“priorities” in its foreign policy, support a “structure of rules, practices
and values by which the world will be bound,” “engage with all the great
powers” and not just those against which it seeks to balance, give its support
to an “ad hoc order” and resolve disputes through multitude of institutions,
avoid “overreact[ing]” in its response to conflicts and utilize the skills of
the plethora of non-state actors at its disposal including “foundations,
universities, charities and private individuals working abroad,” and finally, that
it seek to restore its “legitimacy” in the eyes of the rest of the world
(Zakaria 2009: 235-250). Several of these principles could be more
appropriately categorized as realist rather than liberal. For instance, in
recommending that the U.S. set “priorities” in its foreign policy, Zakaria
notes that “every choice to engage in some cause…is a distraction from the
larger strategic issues that confront the United States,” suggestive of a
realist view that the central objective of politics is to seek “maximum
relative power” and a view that the world should be seen as it is and not as it
should be (Zakaria 2009: 235, 238; Mearsheimer 1995: 48; Coelho A 2010). Furthermore, in outlining his third
guideline, Zakaria notes that “if things do not work out, [engagement] gives
the United States legitimacy and leeway to move into a balancing role,” a
comment which gives credence to a realist view of balance of power politics
(Zakaria 2009: 242). In the end, it appears more appropriate to categorize each
of the author’s views separately, rather than categorizing the author himself
into a boxed-in theoretical framework.
In closing, Robert Kagan’s The Return of
History and the End of Dreams and Fareed Zakaria’s The Post-American
World are two books that offer contrasting analyses of the twenty-first
century world order and America’s role within it. Whereas Kagan defines
American hegemony in largely militaristic terms, seeing it likely to continue,
Zakaria focuses on factors outside of narrow military interests and predicts
the end of American hegemony. In the end, each author comes to differing
conclusions with respect to the challenges facing U.S. foreign policy, the
importance of the global market in shaping the events of the twenty-first
century, the role of democratization as a continuing model for stability, peace
and development, U.S. relations vis-à-vis emerging powers, and the roles of
globalization, soft power, Islamic terrorism and other non-state actors.
Although Kagan primarily approaches his analysis from the perspective of
realism and Zakaria from liberalism, an analysis of the prescriptions they
offer America in dealing with the problems of the twenty-first century suggests
that it may not be possible to box a political theorist into a single
theoretical framework. In the end, analysis of Kagan and Zakaria’s views
suggest that well-intentioned policymakers should draw from a variety of
theoretical perspectives when establishing foreign policy in the twenty-first
century world.
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