In Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign
Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, Jacob Viner examines
the theoretical underpinnings of the economic doctrine known as mercantilism.
Through his writings, he endeavors to discern the mercantilist’s conception of
the relationship between “power,” or political might and “plenty,” or economic
wealth (Viner 1948: 1). While it is commonly believed that the mercantilists
viewed power as the “sole objective” of foreign relations, Viner turns to the
historical record to determine the validity of this conception (Viner 1948:
14). Through careful analysis of available evidence, Viner endeavors to
establish whether the mercantilists viewed power as the end-all of public
policy, or whether they viewed wealth creation and accumulation as an equally
and simultaneously important objective of policy-making. His findings suggest
that the two concepts converge with the mercantilists having viewed wealth as a
means to power, and power as a means to wealth. He ultimately concludes that
mercantilist doctrine united both “power” and “plenty” as “proper ultimate ends
of national policy” and that both ends are “fundamentally harmonious” (Viner
1948: 1, 10, 17).
Viner’s understanding of
mercantilism sheds light on a doctrine which can help explain the establishment
of the modern-day international system. Since the Treaty of Westphalia in the
seventeenth century, the world has become divided into sovereign nation-states,
each seeking to advance its own interests and protect its populace. Although
mercantilist doctrine developed on the heels of the age of imperialism- an age
which saw the prominence of political power as a means of preventing the
violent encroachment upon one’s territory by others- mercantilist scholars were
nevertheless interested in trade as a source of economic growth not only for
the purpose of advancing a nation’s political and security interests, but for
the final objective of establishing economic welfare for its citizenry. For
instance, in a 1903 text entitled The Growth of English Industry and
Commerce in Modern Times, Vol. II, it was openly declared that “From the
Revolution till the revolt of the colonies, the regulation of commerce was
considered, not so much with reference to other elements of national power, or
even in its bearing on revenue, but chiefly with a view to the promotion of
industry” (Viner 1948: 3). Similarly, in the 1906 publication of The Wisdom
of the Wise, it was argued that “In the pre-scientific days the end which
men of affairs kept in view, when debating economic affairs, was clearly
understood; the political power of the realm was the object they put before
them” and that in modern times, men were no longer “so ready to engage in
aggressive wars for the sake of commercial advantages, as Englishmen were in
the eighteenth century” (Viner 1948: 3). Additionally, in an unsigned, obscure
pamphlet dated 1754, it was argued that “Great Britain, of herself, has nothing
to fight for, nothing to support, nothing to augment but her commerce” (Viner
1948: 14). Finally, in 1704, a minister of the Duke of Savoy observed that “the
maritime powers were so attentive to their interests of trade and commerce,
that, perhaps, they would… abandon the common interests of Europe” by
discontinuing their effort to defeat France in a war then under way. (Viner
1948: 21) Thus, despite the commonplace belief that power was the sole
objective of mercantilist endeavors in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, there exists an historical basis for a contradiction of this
assumption.
In his article, Viner offers an explanation as to why the
mercantilist scholars of his day had not previously endeavored to investigate
the question of whether the doctrine supported the conclusion that wealth
accumulation is a desirable end in itself. He argues that the economic
historians who had advanced the power-centric view of mercantilism over the
years were themselves staunch supporters of nationalism and supported the
notion that the state is to take precedence over the individual. (Viner 1948:
4) He defines them as having been “hostile to nineteenth century liberalism and
its revolt against the residues of mercantilist legislation” (Viner 1948: 4).
Giving credence to the interests and pursuits of the liberal-minded bourgeoisie
class whom they despised was something these scholars did not want to do.
(Viner 1948: 4) Based on this interpretation, Viner is able to paint a
different picture of mercantilism than was purported by the scholars of his
time. In contradistinction to the power-centric view, he is able to analyze an
economic doctrine objectively by considering the historical record without
infusing his own political ideology.
Viner’s interpretation of mercantilism proffers a theory
which can perhaps better explain the motivations behind state policy in the
present day. An illustration of state behavior under Viner’s interpretation of
mercantilism is the events that took place in Germany following World War II.
After facing the reality of losing the war and having to rebuild an identity
tarnished by the actions of the Nazi regime, Germany faced the prospect of
heeding to the political subservience of the Allied powers, or choosing a route
that would ultimately serve to diffuse its sovereignty and reduce its
unilateral political power. In choosing the later route, Germany pursued
integration with France initially through the European Coal and Steel
Community, and later through the European Community, European Monetary System,
and now the European Union. The steps taken by Germany toward supranational
integration with a larger European continent have served to benefit Germany to
the extent that it helped rebuild a war-torn state and promulgate a new German
identity and wave of thought based on the pursuit of economic power. However,
in doing so, Germany has ultimately had to give up a certain degree of its
autonomy- and thus its political power- to its European neighbors. The pursuit
of economic power has all but replaced Germany’s quest for undying political
power, and the former has become an end in and of itself.
In Power Versus Plenty
as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,
Jacob Viner investigates the basis for the modern-day understanding of the
doctrine of mercantilism. He finds that contrary to the prevailing views of
economic historians, mercantilists viewed “power” and “plenty” as separate and
distinctive goals of foreign policy. He argues that the lack of a rigorous
investigation into the foundations of the theory served an ideological purpose
for those scholars who sought to advance a core belief in nationalism. The
doctrine of mercantilism as described by Viner can explain certain aspects of
international cooperation in modern times that the previous, power-based
conception of mercantilism could not. A case in point is Germany in the
post-World War II era and its emphasis on the pursuit of national economic
power through international coordination and European integration at the
expense of its political autonomy. As the world becomes increasingly
interdependent and economic cooperation continues to expand, it is probable
that Viner’s view of mercantilism and its emphasis on the pursuit of both power
as well as plenty will allow mercantilism a continuing applicability to
contemporary global affairs.
Works Cited
Viner,
Jacob. "Power Versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the
Seventeenth
and Eighteen Centuries." World Politics 1.1
(1948): 1-29. JSTOR. Web. 16 Sept. 2009.
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