Introduction
The geo-political identity of Taiwan remains one of the most
contentious issues in pacific affairs and international relations in
contemporary times. The present crisis emerged as an outgrowth of China’s
legacy of colonialism, and its subsequent endeavor to reclaim the territories
that were previously under its sovereignty. As a result of China’s loss in the
first Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan was ceded to Japan, which administered the
territory until the end of World War II. Since that time, Taiwan’s geo-political
status has remained in a state of ambiguity and confusion, with Taiwan establishing
its own democratic system of governance under the title Republic of China, and the
People’s Republic of China on the mainland refuting Taiwanese independence, instead
claiming itself as the sole legitimate governing authority. The tension between
China and Taiwan has embodied itself in the international political arena,
where governments and international organizations have been forced to render a
position on the issue by either choosing to empower Taiwan with legitimacy or recognizing
the People’s Republic of China as having sovereignty over the territory. With
China emerging as a prominent actor on the international stage both
economically and militarily, the tension surrounding the Taiwan Strait has the
ability to define global affairs for years to come. Countries that choose to
support Taiwanese independence may risk chastising themselves from amicable
relations with China. Furthermore, Taiwan’s current government has advocated for
controversial steps to be taken aimed at establishing the territory as an
official sovereign entity; the extent of China’s response to which is yet to be
realized. These factors have rendered it of paramount importance for the region
and for the world that the two parties agree on an amicable solution as soon as
possible. An analysis of the geo-political issues surrounding Taiwan can provide
an understanding of geography in its relationship with political affairs and
international relations, as well as provide insight into a conflict that may
serve to play a prominent role in shaping the pacific century.
Analysis
Causes
An understanding of the conflict surrounding Taiwan requires an
understanding of the evolution of complex interrelations between competing
domestic forces in China as well as foreign influence and international law. Beginning
in 1683, Taiwan was made a province of China’s Qing Dynasty. (Qimao 1987: 1163)
The Taiwanese conflict dates back to the first Sino-Japanese War, which was
fought between China and Japan in 1894-95. As a result of the Qing Dynasty’s loss,
the territory of Taiwan was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki.
(Qimao 1987: 1167) At that time, Taiwan remained a largely undeveloped
territory and its development was constrained by its heavily mountainous and
limited arable land. (CIA 2007: 2) Under Japanese colonial rule, Taiwan was
governed according to a strict regimen, which served to foster the development
of industry and infrastructure. (Knapp 1978: 362) After Japan’s loss in World
War II, Taiwan was returned to China via the Cairo Declaration; however by that
time, the Qing Dynasty had long collapsed and China was in a state of internal
conflict regarding who its legitimate governing body was. (Qimao 1987: 1165) As
a result of the Chinese Civil War, China became divided into two warring
factions: including the Chinese Communist Party under Mao Zedong and the KMT
Nationalist Party under General Chang Kai-shek. (ICG 2004: 1) Those advocating
Taiwanese independence assert that it was Chang Kai-shek who formally accepted
the return of Taiwan to China in the Cairo Declaration. (Ogden 2008: 70)
However, in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party and the People’s Republic of
China emerged victoriously in the Chinese Civil War and declared themselves as
the sole legitimate government of China, and as a result, the KMT Nationalist
Party and its Republic of China were forced into exile to Taiwan. (Dreyer 2008:
77) Many members of the international community were reluctant to recognize the
PRC as the official government of China, and for a period of twenty years the
Republic of China was treated as the sole governing entity of China. (Qimao
1987: 1168) Thus, the geopolitical status of Taiwan has been seen as dependent
on the disputed legitimacy of its government during the Chinese Civil War. Geography
has been one of the primary reasons as to why China has vehemently sought to
incorporate Taiwan with Mainland China. The island of Taiwan is only about
one-hundred miles away from the Mainland, and because of its location, its
independence is believed to represent a substantial security threat to Chinese
interests. (Nathan 1996: 87) The United States has traditionally sided with
Taiwan in the territorial dispute, seeing the island as a bulwark of defense
against the spread of Communism in East Asia, and has embedded its support in
the form of treaties and domestic laws. (Collinwood 2008: 118; Kanatsu 2007: 3)
U.S. involvement in a 1950 naval blockade to prevent a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan, and its subsequent promulgation of a Mutual Defense Treaty promising to
defend Taiwan in the event of military conflicts demonstrated the depth of
America’s effort to protect the island from falling to communist rule. (Qimao
1987: 1162) By the early 1970s, it became clear that it would be impossible to
permanently marginalize a power as great as the People’s Republic of China in
international relations; and subsequently, the PRC was given Taiwan’s seat in
the United Nations, which in effect justified the PRC’s claim to sovereignty
over Taiwan. (Collinwood 2008: 118) Although the United States, by virtue of
its 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, recognized the PRC as sole legitimate government
of Taiwan by abandoning its Mutual Security Treaty, it has nevertheless maintained
its promise to Taiwan that it will step in to defend the territory if a
military conflict were to arise with China under a domestic law known as the Taiwan
Relations Act. (Qimao 1987: 1165; Dreyer 2008: 319) In the 1980’s, Deng
Xiaoping initiated a system known as “one country, two systems,” which allowed
former colonies including Macao and Hong Kong status as Special Administrative
Regions, affording them a certain degree of autonomy. (Dreyer 2008: 326) The
Republic of China was offered this as a resolution to the territorial dispute
in the early 1980s, a solution of which it declined on the basis of its growing
ideological disagreement with Mainland China. (Qimao 1987: 1171) China’s
willingness after Taiwan’s initial refusal to allow for a similar agreement
with the territory was tarnished by China’s Tiananmen Square demonstrations,
the division of the former Soviet Union, and U.S. interference in the Middle East,
all of which China interpreted as demanding of strong centralized power (Dreyer
2008: 304). Although geographically proximate, Taiwan has in recent years
established an increasingly distinct political and economic identity from that
of Mainland China. Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has developed democratic form
of governance, allowing for the formation of opposition political parties, and
since 1996, holding elections for the position of the Taiwanese presidency.
(Ogden 2008: 81-82) Economically, Taiwan has become a Mecca for technological
production and its market has remained largely un-integrated with the Mainland,
exporting the majority of its production to the United States which affords the
island special trade incentives. (Ogden 2008: 77; Qimao 1987: 1168) These
factors have afforded Taiwan a separate and distinctive identity from that of
Mainland China, and have rendered efforts to formally unite the two
increasingly difficult.
Current and Future Impacts
In modern times, China has been able to reclaim Macao and Hong Kong,
territories lost during the colonial era; yet Taiwan remains its only former
colony presently asserting its independence. Current Taiwanese President Chen
Shui-bian is advocating for Taiwan’s independence in the face of staunch
Chinese opposition. (GOV 2007: 2) Over the past few years, President Chen
Shui-bian has closed Taiwan’s “National Unification Council” as well as the
“National Unification Guidelines,” serving to increase tensions along the
Taiwan Strait. (People’s Daily A 2006: 1) According to the Taiwanese
government, Chinese leaders have in recent years refused to communicate with
Taiwan’s elected leaders, intensified their effort to prohibit Taiwanese
participation in international forums, and have deployed hundreds of ballistic
missiles to its coastline aiming at Taiwan (GIO 2004: 1) Furthermore, the
establishment of a 2005 “anti-succession” law demonstrates the extent of China’s
effort to discern separatist activities and response to them with force
(People’s Daily A 2006: 1). More recently, China has repetitively threatened to
intervene militarily in the event of a Taiwanese declaration of independence,
and has progressed towards strengthening its military capability to prepare for
such an attack. (Yardley 2007: 2) The graph on the left demonstrates the
significant extent of China’s military buildup from 1994 till 2005, as
estimated by the U.S. Department of Defense. In 2007, the Chinese government
has stated that it intends to expand its military budget by over seventeen
percent, and many analysts concur that its primary reason for its doing so is
to offset any efforts by Taiwan to formally seek its independence. (Yardley 2007:
1) China has repetitively initiated military exercises in the Taiwan Strait,
often doing so just prior to Taiwanese elections so as to indoctrinate fear
into the hearts of voters to coerce them into electing leaders against
independence in an effort to advance the interests of unification. (Faison
1996: 1) Chinese officials have stated that if the United States were to
intervene militarily on behalf of Taiwan in a conflict, the country would not
hesitate to use long range missiles if not nuclear weapons against the United
States. (BNET 2005: 1-2) The United States government has recently supplied
Taiwan with submarines and destroyers for the blatant purpose of preparing for
an attack against China, serving to the anger of Beijing. (BBC 2001: 2) Some
believe that the current Taiwanese government is planning to pronounce its
independence just prior to the Beijing Olympics scheduled for the summer of
2008, during which time it is believed that China would be preoccupied by the
events and find itself unable to attack the island. (China Daily 2003: 1) If
such an occurrence were to take place, it would be difficult to predict China’s
immediate reaction. However, it seems plausible that if a solution is not found
to this conflict and China continues at its current rate of military expansion,
a crisis might be provoked at some point in the future, serving to polarize the
world into a Cold War-type set of military alliances with China and the United
States going head-to-head in a full-blown military confrontation. Nearby Japan,
whose government has in recent years actively sought to revise its constitution
to allow for the establishment of military forces, has found these developments
in East Asia concerning and has pledged to support Taiwan and the United States
in a conflict. (Onishi 2007: 1; Yale 2005: 1) On the other hand, Russia has
advocated for unification, pledging its support to the PRC in the event of a
confrontation. (People’s Daily B 2005: 1) In addition to the aforementioned
potential for military confrontation, both Taiwan and Mainland China are placed
at a disadvantage economically by virtue of the restrictions placed on trade
between the two, which allows them to engage in trade with one another only
through third parties such as Hong Kong; a restriction which vastly increases
their mutual costs of doing business. (Collinwood 2008: 118) Analysts have
noted that economies of Taiwan and China are “complimentary” to one another,
and Taiwanese development is hampered by its lack of natural resources and limited
access to markets and capital, resources of which China has readily available.
(Qimao 1987: 1169) Thus, a solution to the conflict would serve the interests
of both entities, and should therefore be considered. However, if a solution is
not found, the extent of the impact that a worsening of the relationship
between Taiwan and China would have on both powers as well as the international
community is difficult to limit; and further confrontation may prove to
drastically redefine East Asia as well as the world at large.
Solutions
Judging on the basis of China’s staunch unwillingness to allow for
Taiwanese independence, and Taiwan’s reluctance to fully incorporate with
China, it appears as though the only amicable solution to the conflict would be
for Taiwan to accept the notion of “one country, two systems,” with all of the
rights offered to it as proposed in the early 1980s. These rights included
provisions that would require Taiwan to unify with China and give up its claim
of a supposed right to “self-determination,” but in exchange, China would grant
the island autonomy as a “special administrative region,” allowing it to
maintain its own military and judicial systems, its democratic political system
and the economic property rights to which its people are currently afforded,
and would provide Taiwan with a limited autonomy in terms of foreign policy.
(Qimao 1987: 1170-73) Accordingly, Taiwan would be made a Special Administrative
Region with an extensive degree of autonomy from Beijing. Scholars have argued
that it would be impractical for China to impose its communist economic system
and authoritarian political system on Taiwan; not only have the Taiwanese
adapted to capitalism and democracy, Taiwan’s economic success can be
attributed to their very existence. (Qimao 1987: 1171-72) Rendering Taiwan a
Special Administrative Region with such an extensive degree of autonomy would
satisfy China’s goal of reunifying the various colonies it has lost over the
past five centuries, while at the same time satisfying Taiwan’s goal of having
the ability to maintain its political and economic systems, as well as its own
culture and ideology. A solution to this conflict would not only reduce tension
between China and Taiwan, but would also serve to quell the fears of other
regional powers. Furthermore, this resolution would offset the risk of the
world finding itself divided in its support between the hegemonic powers of
China and the United States as they fiercely defend their interests. Thus, although
this solution would require both sides to make substantial concessions to one
another, it appears as though a modified “one-country, two systems” approach is
the only foreseeable resolution to the conflict.
The issue surrounding the ambiguity of Taiwan’s geo-political identity
remains one of the most pressing East Asian problem having global implications.
Emerging out of Japanese colonization of Taiwan, and its subsequent
recapitulation to warring internal forces within China, the territory has seen
its external identity vacillate between international recognition as a
sovereign state and being seen simply as a province of the People’s Republic of
China. In recent years, China’s economic and military might has ascended to new
heights, affecting the geo-political landscape and creating a new system of alliances.
China has boosted its anti-Taiwanese independence rhetoric in recent years,
seeing the island and its location relative to Mainland China’s coastline as a
potential threat to Chinese security. In recent years, Taiwan has grown
increasingly apart from Mainland China in terms of political and economic
ideology, and tension has grown along the Taiwan Strait as a result of the
election of pro-independence Taiwanese leaders that have advocated for a
Taiwanese declaration of independence. Some predict that the upcoming Beijing
Summer Olympics will occupy the PRC and make it possible for Taiwan to stage
its independence; the result of which would likely only increase tension in the
region. It was argued that ongoing tension and the possibility of military
confrontation in the region may serve to split the world in two according to
political ideology, similar to the Cold War. In addition to the political
implications that this conflict has espoused, tension between the two powers
has limited the potential for each to participate economically in each other’s
markets. A mutual agreement between Taiwan and China would be in the best
interests of both powers as well as the world at large. A solution was proposed
in which Taiwan would be incorporated with China as a quasi-autonomous Special
Administrative Region, allowing the territory significant concessions such as its
being able to retain its own military and justice system, as well as its
democratic political system and capitalist economic system. In exchange, Taiwan
would be required to unify with China and abandon its advocacy of
“self-determination.” This solution would be a compromise between both parties,
and would put an end to what otherwise may amount to be one of the most disastrous
geo-political conflicts of the pacific century.
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